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No. 1581



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
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
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ARMED FORCES

SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 2-5

[Article by Maj Gen V. Novikov, Col Justice N. Kuznetsov: "Lenin's Principles of Soviet Military Construction"]

[Text]

Soviet military construction constitutes a whole complex of economic, political and moral as well as properly military measures implemented by the Soviet state to ensure the country's defence.

The principles of Soviet military construction were formulated by V. I. Lenin, who did not divorce them from the general principles of Party and state construction, from the general tasks of the building of socialism. "The development of our army," he wrote, "led to successful results only because it was carried out in the spirit of general Soviet organisation."

Military construction is an objective process carried out in a developed socialist society with the aim of ensuring external security and establishing favourable conditions for social and economic development. It is based on a number of principles. The main one is the principle of Party guidance of the Armed Forces. It ensues from the special role played by the Communist Party as the leading and guiding force of the socialist society as a whole.

The Soviet Communist Party's guidance and leadership in the sphere of military development is manifested in the fact that each important question is elaborated by the Party before becoming a programme of action for the state and the people. The Party formulates the policy of the state in the field of military establishment and technology and works out its military doctrine. It elaborates the principles of military construction and organises their practical realisation. It guides the training

and placing of military cadres and controls the work of military institutions. Only the Communist Party can ensure the successful implementation of all these tasks, for it is armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, closely linked with the people and enjoys its boundless confidence, is cemented by Party discipline and possesses the unique feature of being capable of inspiring and organising the masses. In the Soviet Armed Forces Party policies and directives are implemented by the military councils, the commanders with one-man authority, the political departments, Party and YCL organisations.

The most important means by which the Communist Party influences the life and activities of the Armed Forces and one of Lenin's Party principles on the guidance of the Armed Forces is well-organised, systematic and purposeful Party-political work.

The CPSU military policy underwent a serious test in the years of the Great Patriotic War, when the first in the world socialist state had to wage an armed struggle against Nazi Germany -- the shock detachment of world imperialism. The gigantic work conducted by the Party in the pre-war years made it possible to turn the country into a powerful war camp. Moulded by an indivisible will and single impulse, the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, servicemen of the army and navy, educated by the Party and the Soviet Government, were able to accomplish a feat the equal of which history had not known. It is to the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces that the de-

cisive role in the complete rout of fascist Germany and militarist Japan in the Second World War belongs.

The present stage of Soviet military development is characterised by the further enhancement of the leading role of the Communist Party. This is due to the fact that the Party is the only mouth-piece of the vital interests of the working class, all working people, including those working in the sphere of the USSR military defence. In the situation prevailing today the CPSU exerts all its efforts to ensure that the necessary conditions are to hand for the realisation of the gigantic plans of peaceful construction and that the Soviet state is always fully armed in the event of possible aggression by imperialism.

The enhanced role and significance of the Party in guiding military development are also determined by military-technological reasons. These lie in the consequences of the technological revolution, which are enormous in scale and depth. In conditions of this revolution the Party maps out perspective trends of military-technological development, determining the correct correlation between the different elements of the military organisational structure and seeing to the equipment of the Armed Forces with the most modern types of weapons and combat equipment.

Questions concerning the training of military personnel are also constantly in the focus of attention of the CPSU. The Party carries out considerable work in the sphere of selecting and placing officer personnel and improving the military educational system.

The Soviet Army has a well organised system of ideological-educational work directed at developing in servicemen high-principled ideological convictions and love for their mother country. The indefatigable work done by the Party in this field is giving tangible results. All this is borne out by the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War and the numerous cases of courage, bravery and nobleness in time of peace.

The CPSU guidance of the Armed Forces also manifests itself by ensuring that the role and influence of the Party organisations in the army and navy are intensified in every possible way. In recent years a number of decisions directed at raising the role of political organs and Party organisations in all sections of the military establishment have been adopted.

One of the most important principles of Soviet military development is the class principle. The class principle is applied in the armies of all coun-

tries. But the bourgeois military theorists try to camouflage the class nature of imperialist armies, because it is profoundly anti-popular. On the contrary, the class principle in the Soviet Armed Forces testifies to the genuine popular nature of a socialist army. At the beginning of its existence the Red Army was founded and formed on the principle of class selection. This was manifested in the choice and placing of officer cadres and in the recruitment to the army and navy.

When the remains of the exploiter classes had been done away with in the USSR and the moral and political unity of Soviet society had been achieved and firmly established, the necessity for the class approach in resolving these problems no longer arose. This found expression in the method of recruiting the army and navy personnel, the selection and placing of officer cadres and the content of the ideological and political education of the men. If, for example, before the victory of socialism in the USSR the call-up to military service was limited in respect of representatives of non-working elements of the population and people of exploiter class (kulaks and others) extraction, beginning with 1936 these limitations were abolished, since the reason for imposing them had disappeared with the liquidation of these classes. Equality of rights and obligations in safeguarding the socialist Homeland was extended to all Soviet citizens.

In accordance with the USSR law of universal military service, today, all male citizens of the USSR, irrespective of racial and national affiliation, religion, education, residence and social and property status, are bound to serve with the colours in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The defence of the socialist Homeland is the concern of the whole people, and military service is regarded in the Soviet Constitution as an honourable duty of Soviet citizens.

In the recruitment of officers social origin also ceased to play its former role. Today the Soviet Armed Forces' officer body is recruited from the best representatives of all layers of Soviet society. The main criterion for promotion to appointment in the army and navy is devotion, fidelity, loyalty to the people and socialist Homeland, high moral, political and professional qualities, and personal abilities.

At present, when the Soviet Armed Forces have grown into an army of all the people, in the full sense of the expression, the class nature of their development loses its significance as regards their recruitment, but in the foreign policy plan it is fully preserved.

Unity of the army and people occupies an important place among the determining social and

political principles of the Soviet Armed Forces' development. The advanced Soviet social and state structure made it possible to create such armed forces, indivisibly linked with the people and reliably safeguarding its interests.

The socialist basis of this unity is the socialist social and state structure, the popular nature of state power, the close alliance of the working class, peasantry and people's intelligentsia, the friendship and fraternity of all nations and ethnic groups in the country. The ideological basis of the unity of the socialist army and the people is the Marxist-Leninist ideology. It forms in all builders and defenders of Soviet society a scientific, communist outlook and a profound understanding of the necessity and importance of defending the socialist Homeland.

The close ties of the army and people became apparent, with unprecedented strength, in the years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). Hundreds of thousands of Soviet patriots volunteered to go to the front. From them were formed many of the military units which took part in the successful rout of the enemy.

Toilers of the Soviet home-front likewise did not spare their strength or means to help the army. Their voluntary monetary contributions alone to the defence fund totalled 118 thousand 200 million roubles. More than 2.5 thousand fighting planes, several thousand tanks and guns, more than 20 submarines and naval motor launches and a large number of other combat equipment were made with the money.

The unity of the army and people was impressively confirmed by the partisan movement, which spread on the Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the enemy. The partisan formations operating in the enemy's rear by the end of 1943 totalled over a million people.

The inviolable unity of the people and the army, which was one of the most important sources of the might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, continues to develop and strengthen in peaceful conditions. The popular nature of the Soviet Armed Forces has given the class unity of the army and people a new content, made it more close and indivisible, imparted a special meaning to the individual responsibilities of each citizen, each serviceman for fulfilling his sacred duty to his Motherland.

The Soviet people, the local Party and Government bodies show constant concern for the Soviet servicemen. Representatives of Party organisations of the Republics, regions, cities and districts take part in the work of military councils, Party conferences and meetings in the forces. In

turn, servicemen of the Armed Forces take an active part in the work of the Party, Government and public organisations, are elected to the local Soviets, the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous and Union Republics, the USSR Supreme Soviet and leading Party organisations. Nearly 14 thousand servicemen are deputies to elected bodies of local and supreme state power.

One of the important factors determining the high combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is the community of aims and actions of all the personnel. Soviet servicemen see in their officers representatives of the people, their educators and tutors. They learn from them and follow their example. The officers' orders are considered by the men as orders of the Motherland, the Party, the entire Soviet people.

The unity of the army and people is likewise clearly seen in the fact that the Soviet Army enjoys the well-deserved fame of a remarkable school of political training, of courage, development of high moral and combat qualities and patriotic and international education. Service in the Armed Forces helps to resolve one of the most important tasks of the Party and people — the forming of active, conscientious builders and defenders of the new society.

The principles of socialist internationalism and friendship among nations are also at the foundation of Soviet military development. Proceeding from Lenin's instructions concerning the significance of socialist internationalism in military construction and taking into account the multi-national composition of the country and the striving of all nations and nationalities to defend their socialist gains, the CPSU gives these questions unflagging attention.

Lenin's nationalities policy, the policy of equality and convergence of the working people of all nations and ethnic groups of the Soviet state, their education in the spirit of friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism is the most important source for raising the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

A stern test of the strength of the internationalist bonds uniting the multi-national Soviet Armed Forces into a single fighting family was the Great Patriotic War. The mighty strength of the friendship of nations and inviolable fighting unity of the men were revealed on all sectors of the fronts during the entire course of the war. Hitler, hoping to disunite the peoples of the USSR, to sow the seeds of discord among them and set nation against nation, was faced by a single, invincible unity against which the fascist war machine was smashed.

The world historical victory in the war against a strong and perfidious enemy demonstrated the great, insuperable might of the friendship and fraternity of peoples and of socialist internationalism. It convincingly confirmed the vital force of Lenin's ideas on the army of a new type, guided by the Communist Party—a really people's multi-national army of a socialist state.

The formation and consolidation in the post-war period of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is the embodiment of the harmonious combination of international interests and national peculiarities in the military field. This military alliance of the fraternal countries had raised the defence potential of the socialist community to a higher and qualitatively new stage. It has stood the test of time with honour. The firm and resolute position occupied by the Warsaw Treaty countries have more than once sobered down the imperialist aggressors.

Such are the socio-political principles of Soviet military construction in accordance with which the Soviet Armed Forces are being developed.

(To be continued)

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ARMED FORCES

WARTIME OPERATIONS: BATTLE OF BERLIN

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 17-19

[Article, under the heading "Military History", by Col A. Zvenzlovsky (Zvenslovskiy) Cand. Sci. (History): "The Berlin Operation"]

(Text)

The Battle of Berlin (April 16-May 8, 1945) was the culminating point of the bitterest and most destructive war in the history of humanity, a war prepared by world imperialism and unleashed by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, when it attacked Poland. For a relatively short period of time the Hitlerites, meeting practically no serious resistance, managed to enslave nearly the whole of Western Europe.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany perfidiously attacked the Soviet Union. The very first engagements on Soviet soil showed that the war in the East bore no resemblance to the operations of the Wehrmacht in the West. It was here on the Soviet-German front, in battles, grandiose in scale and intensity, that the backbone of Nazi Germany and the major forces of the Nazi army and the armies of the Nazi Reich's satellites was broken. The Soviet Armed Forces routed and took prisoner 607 enemy divisions, as compared with the American and British forces' nearly 176 divisions.

In those years the anti-Hitler coalition—a military-political alliance of states and peoples, the main participants of which were the USSR, the USA and Britain — was formed and strengthened. The leading role in the coalition belonged to the Soviet Union, who bore the brunt of the struggle against the enemy.

During the war Nazi Germany lost her allies and found herself in political isolation. The war was waged now on German territory.

In the spring of 1945, the Soviet Army having reached the line of the Oder after the winter offensive, was 60 km from Berlin. The Soviet forces were preparing to deliver the last crushing blow.


Heavy fighting was going on all along the Soviet-German front.

The Wehrmacht's main forces were still concentrated in the East, against the Soviet Army. By April 16, there were 214 Nazi divisions and 14 brigades here while in all 60 enemy divisions with only 200 tanks were operating against the western Allies.

The capital of the Nazi Reich was not only the political bulwark of nazism, but also a large centre of war industry. The main enemy forces were concentrated in the Berlin direction. The Nazi leadership strove not to allow the Soviet Army to capture Berlin at any cost. It thought that it "would be better to surrender Berlin to the Anglo-Saxons than to allow Russians to enter it." In a special document dated April 3, the Nazi leaders claimed that "the holding of the Eastern Front was the precondition for a turn in the course of the war." Hitler and his close associates cherished to the very end the possibility of concluding a separate peace with the USA and Britain.

The Soviet leadership followed events closely. As a result of measures taken by it already in March, all attempts of the representatives of the Western powers to carry out secret separate negotiations with the Hitlerite representatives were frustrated. Berlin had to be captured quickly so as to force Nazi Germany capitulate entirely and unconditionally as foreseen in the decisions taken by the participants of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Battle of Berlin was notable for its stubbornness and bitterness because for the Nazi Reich it was the only chance to survive. And the Nazi bosses stopped at nothing, mobilised children and old men in the army, made senseless sacrifices,



ces, brought the country to the verge of destruction. The order was issued to fight to the last man and to shoot on the spot anyone who tried to retreat or withdraw.

Enormous manpower and equipment were hurled into the defence of Berlin. The capital was protected by powerful, deeply-echeloned defences. These comprised two major lines: the Oder-Neisse, consisting of three defence zones with a total depth of 20 to 40 km, and the Berlin defence area with three defensive rings: the outer, the inner and the city ring. Particularly strong enemy forces and engineer installations defended the Küstrin

and Cottbus sectors. Thus, on the Küstrin bridgehead, captured by the Soviet forces during the winter offensive, the enemy had 60 guns and 17 tanks per kilometre of frontage, and the defence zone of a division was only 3 km. Berlin itself was turned into a powerful fortress.

The approaches to Berlin were covered by two army groups — "Vistula" and "Centre," comprising 63 divisions, various formations and units totalling nearly 1,000,000 men, 10,400 guns and mortars, 1,500 tanks and assault guns and 3,300 combat planes. Eight divisions were in the reserve of the High Command of the ground forces. Be-

sides, the Berlin garrison numbered over 200,000 men.

The grouping of the Soviet forces comprised 2,500,000 officers and men, nearly 42,000 guns and mortars, over 6,250 tanks and self-propelled guns and 7,500 combat aircraft.

The Soviet Supreme Command assigned the forces the mission to defeat the enemy grouping defending Berlin, to capture Germany's capital and reach the Elbe to join up with the Allies. The forces of the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian fronts and the 1st Ukrainian Front, under the command of Marshals of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov, K. Rokossovsky and I. Konev, and also part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were committed to the operation. The 1st and the 2nd armies of Wojsko Polskie operated as part of the Soviet fronts.

The concept of the operation foresaw powerful cutting blows on a wide frontage, encirclement of the Berlin grouping, its breaking up and piecemeal destruction. The Soviet forces were to carry out the assigned mission in 12-15 days. The Soviet Command planned a two-and-a-half hour powerful artillery and air bombardment to destroy the enemy engineer installations and to neutralise the enemy to the utmost. After breaking through the enemy defences the tank armies and corps were to rush on into the operational depth.

A thorough and all-round preparation: operational, engineer, material and technological preceded the operation. The following figures give an idea of the scale of the operation. The 1st Byelorussian Front alone was provided with nearly 240,000 tons of ammunition and fuel and lubricants. When organising the starting area for the offensive on the Küstrin bridgehead alone, hundreds of kilometres of trenches and communication trenches were dug and 25 bridges across the Oder were built.

Prior to the offensive various kinds of Party-political work were carried out. The commanders and political workers explained to the men the historic significance of the mission assigned them—to capture Berlin and to crown the war in Europe with victory. The offensive began on the eve of a date dear to all Soviet people—the 22nd of April—the 75th birth anniversary of V. I. Lenin, the founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Lectures were delivered and talks given in units and subunits about the life and activity of the great leader. The Soviet fighting men prepared enthusiastically for the forthcoming battle. In those days many of them joined the Communist Party. From March 15 to April 15, over

17,000 fighting men were admitted to the Party on the three above mentioned fronts. In the night of April 15, Party and Komsomol meetings were held in the units. Appeals of the military councils of fronts calling on the officers and men to act resolutely and courageously were read to the entire personnel.

A reconnaissance in strength carried out on April 14-16 on the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts disclosed the enemy defences with great precision. The offensive started before dawn on April 16. Stunned by the powerful artillery and air bombardment and blinded by the light of searchlights (up to 140 searchlights on the 1st Byelorussian Front) the enemy was paralysed for a time. The attackers rapidly advanced 1.5-2 km. But the enemy, coming to his senses, started putting up stiff resistance. Particularly desperate resistance was offered on the Seelow Heights, where the enemy had well organised powerful engineer installations protected by numerous fire weapons. Heavy, bloody battles ensued. Our advance slowed down. The striking group of the 1st Byelorussian Front had literally to gnaw through the enemy defences. By the end of April 19, it had managed to complete the breakthrough of the third defence zone of the Oder line.

The forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front, having broken through the enemy defences, forced the Spree and began the envelopment of Berlin from the south. By that time formations of the 2nd Byelorussian Front had begun an assault crossing of the Oder. The first stage of the operation had been completed. The Oder-Neisse defensive line of the enemy was broken through.

In the second stage of the operation the Soviet forces started encircling and cutting up the enemy grouping. Already at 1350 hrs on April 20, Soviet artillery opened fire directly at Berlin, and on April 21, fighting began in the city. Operating there were the forces of the 1st Byelorussian Front and also of the 1st Ukrainian Front whose fighting men had covered almost 100 km in two days and rushed into the southern suburbs of Berlin.

The Nazi troops fought desperately. The Hitler Command shifted from the west to the east the 12th Army of General Wenk, which delivered a blow at the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front, thus trying to join up with the forces of the 9th and the remains of the 4th Tank armies, who had managed to fight through to the west. Strong counterblows were delivered by the enemy also in the Dresden direction, in an effort to immobilise the offensive of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

But to contain the onslaught of the advancing Soviet forces was beyond the Hitlerites' power.

On April 20, the forces of the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts encircled south-east of Berlin the large Frankfurt-Ouben enemy grouping and on April 25 emerged west of Berlin, thus completing the encirclement of the entire Berlin grouping. The same day in the area of Torgau on the Elbe a meeting of the Soviet and American forces took place. Meanwhile the forces of the 2nd Byelorussian Front pinned down the enemy 3rd Tank Army north of Berlin and deprived it of the possibility to deliver a counterblow at the Soviet troops who had encircled Berlin.

On April 26 began the third stage of the operation—the destruction of the encircled grouping and the capture of Berlin. Striking in converging directions the Soviet forces cut up the enemy groupings and then destroyed them. By the 1st of May they had crushed the Frankfurt-Ouben grouping. Everywhere the enemy, regardless of losses, was trying to break through to the west. The Soviet forces, manoeuvring skilfully, barred the way to the enemy units and destroyed them.

All the time, by day and by night, fierce fighting was going on in Berlin. Assault detachments and groups formed the basis of the forces fighting in the city. Tanks and the major part of the artillery up to 152-mm and 203-mm guns were attached to infantry subunits for direct support and direct firing.

On April 29, fighting for the Reichstag began. On April 30, the Soviet Sergeants M. A. Yegorov, a Russian, and M. V. Kantariya, a Georgian, hoisted the Banner of Victory over the cupola of Reichstag. On May 2, by 1500 hrs the enemy resistance completely ceased. The remaining forces of the Berlin garrison at the head of the city's defence commander General Weidling surrendered. The Hitlerite Reich was finished with. On May 8, representatives of the German High Command in Karlshorst (Berlin) signed the act of unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. The war in Europe was over.

The Berlin operation has entered for ever into Soviet and foreign history as a remarkable example of the defeat of a large strategic enemy grouping in a short time. In the course of the operation the Soviet forces defeated 93 enemy divisions, took prisoner 480,000 officers and men, captured 1,500 tanks and assault guns and 4,500 combat planes.

In the Berlin operation the Soviet military leaders, generals, officers and men displayed high skill, courage and mass heroism. Over 600 men were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. One million one hundred and forty-one thousand fighting men of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts alone were decorated with Orders and medals. Many units and formations were awarded Orders and honourable titles.

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ARMED FORCES

WARTIME OPERATIONS: LIBERATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 20-22

[Article by Col A. Galitsan, Cand. Sci. (History): "Liberation of Czechoslovakia"]

[Text]

In the autumn of 1944, the Soviet Army approached the borders of Czechoslovakia. This promoted a powerful upsurge of the national-liberation struggle in the country which culminated in the Slovak national insurrection late in August. On the request of the Czechoslovaks several Czechoslovak military units raised in the USSR, Soviet partisan formations and detachments, weapons, combat equipment and ammunition were sent to the territory liberated by the Slovak patriots.

In their desire to render prompt support to the insurgents, the Soviet Command abandoned its initial plan to enter Czechoslovakia by bypassing the Eastern Carpathians in the south and north, and the Soviet forces delivered a frontal blow across the Carpathians. The 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps under General L. Svoboda took part in the offensive.

As a result of the East-Carpathian operation (September 8-October 28, 1944) the Soviet Army entered Slovak territory. The liberation of Czechoslovakia had begun.

Decisive battles of the Soviet Army against the nazi forces on Czechoslovak soil took place in 1945. Early in 1945 the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts mounted an offensive in the western Carpathians. In January-February they liberated a large part of Slovakia and the south of Poland. The 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, the 1st and 4th Romanian armies fought these battles jointly with the Soviet forces and partisan detachments and units successfully cooperated with them. The inhabitants of the mountain areas of Slovakia helped the troops to restore damaged roads and bridges, and acted as their guides.

As a result of the offensive in March-April the forces of the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts defeated a big nazi grouping in the western Carpathians and completely liberated Slovakia and part of Moravia. This offensive pinned down large nazi forces, and favoured the successful completion of Berlin operation and the acceleration of nazi Germany's capitulation.

The military-political situation at the end of April and beginning of May demanded quick liberation of the occupied areas of Czechoslovakia. On its territory and in the north of Austria was a large enemy grouping numbering over 900,000 men, 9,700 guns and mortars, 1,900 tanks and assault guns and 1,000 combat planes. The nazi Command did all it could to prolong the resistance of its grouping in Czechoslovakia. It hoped for disagreement between the Soviet Union and its western Allies, for a separate agreement with the ruling circles of the USA and Britain. The nazis planned, while offering stubborn resistance to the Soviet Army, to open the front to the Anglo-American forces. But these plans were frustrated by the rapid offensive of the Soviet armies.

During the first days of May, popular uprisings started in various areas of Czechoslovakia. In the morning of May 5, the uprising broke out in Prague. To suppress it the nazi Command sent large forces against the capital. The patriots' position became precarious. They appealed to the Command of the Soviet Army and the Allies for help. The Soviet leadership at once responded to the request of the Prague working people and instructed the Command of the 1st, 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts to render immediately assistance to the patriots.


By the beginning of May the enemy grouping on Czechoslovak territory was enveloped in the north, east and south-east by the armies of these fronts. Involved in the operation were over two million officers and men, nearly 30,500 guns and mortars, nearly 2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and over 3,000 aircraft.

The concept of the operation was to deliver a number of powerful blows in directions converging towards Prague, to surround, break up and quickly rout the main forces of the Nazi armies in Czechoslovakia, preventing their withdrawal to the west and south-west. The main blow at the flanks of the enemy grouping was delivered by the 1st Ukrainian Front under Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev from the area south-west of Dresden, and by the 2nd Ukrainian Front under Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky from the Brno area. The 4th Ukrainian Front commanded by General of the Army A. I. Varyomen-

ko was to destroy the enemy in the area of Olomouc and then to advance on Prague from the East.

The preparation for the operation was carried out in an extremely short time. In three days the 3rd and 4th Tank armies and infantry formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front covered up to 200 km from the approaches of Berlin to the starting area north-west of Dresden.

A considerable regrouping of forces took place also on the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Weapons and equipment were put in order, stocks of fuel and ammunition were replenished. Commanders and political workers informed the fighting men on the beginning of the armed uprising in Prague and the insurgents' request for help. The Soviet officers and men were filled with enthusiasm and the desire to complete the liberation of their Czech and Slovak brothers as quickly as possible.



On May 6, the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive. Operations continued both day and night. On May 7, the centre and the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, including the 2nd Army of Wojsko Polskie, began their offensive.

In the night of May 8, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank armies of Generals D. D. Lelyushenko and P. S. Rybalko of the 1st Ukrainian Front performed an 80-kilometre thrust. At dawn their forward units burst into Prague. The forward units of the 3rd Guards Army under General Gordov and the 13th Army under General Pukhov followed them in the morning. The same day mobile groups of the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts entered the capital of Czechoslovakia. Actively supported by detachments of the armed population, the Soviet fighting men completely liberated Prague on May 9.

On May 10, the rapid advance of the Soviet forces continued on all sectors. On a number of sectors they met American units. Almost the entire enemy grouping in Czechoslovakia was encircled. Only a few divisions broke through into the zone of the American army. On May 10-11 the main Nazi forces were taken prisoner. The Prague operation was completed. The Soviet Army had carried out its internationalist duty towards the Czechoslovak people. It had brought them liberation.

The Prague operation was the last operation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the war against Nazi Germany. During the operation the Soviet armies took prisoner 860,000 enemy officers and men

including 60 generals, and captured a large quantity of weapons and combat equipment.

The Prague operation has gone down in the history of military art as model of flexible and mobile troop control, close cooperation of the forces of three fronts, delivering blows in converging directions, using manoeuvres and the most resolute forms and methods of waging war. The specific feature of this operation was the use of tank armies for deep and quick manoeuvre to encircle the enemy main forces in mountainous and wooded country. The average rate of advance of the tank forces in the mountains was 50-60 km a day. The Prague operation again demonstrated the high organisational abilities of the Soviet Command and the skill of the fighting men.

To commemorate the outstanding victory of the Soviet Armed Forces the medal "For the Liberation of Prague" was instituted. All participants in the battle for the city, including 40,000 Czechoslovak citizens were awarded this medal. Honorary titles and combat decorations were conferred on many Soviet formations and units.

The friendship of the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples grew in the battles for the liberation of Czechoslovakia. Characterising it, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, President of the CSSR Gustav Husak said: "This friendship has been strengthened by the blood shed in battles against the common enemy and steeled in everyday labour to build socialism and communism. We shall do everything to strengthen and develop this friendship still more."

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ARMED FORCES

SERVICEMEN'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 46-47

[Article by Lt Col V. Amelchenko: "Social Security for Servicemen"]

(Text)

One of the indicators characterizing living standards of the working people, including servicemen, is social security. Soviet people enjoy all forms and kinds of social services stipulated by the conventions of the International Labour Organisation. And only one of these — unemployment benefit—does not exist in the USSR. Unemployment, in this country, was done away with already in the thirties.

Soviet men and women are entitled to not only old-age pensions, incapacity allowances, sick benefits and so on, but also enjoy other forms of social assistance, such as stipends in all higher and secondary specialised educational establishments, including military ones, treatment at sanatoriums and health resorts either gratis or for partial payment of the accommodation cost, free special vehicles for the disabled, and also — prosthetic and orthopaedic services, accommodation in homes for the aged and disabled and so forth.

Today over 46 million citizens of the USSR, that is, every sixth of the population, receive pensions. The pension age for the majority is 60 for men and 55 for women. It should be noted that for many categories of people working in the mining, chemical, metallurgical and other fields of industry, the pensionable age is reduced to 55-50 for men and 50-45 for women. For working war invalids it has been cut by five years. In the Soviet Union the pension level is far higher than in the developed capitalist countries, being from 50 to 100 per cent of the wages and salaries of those retiring on pension. Such a proportion brings the pensions nearer to the earnings and makes it almost unnecessary to alter one's established customary requirements and expenditures on retirement. And

the fact that many of the Soviet people's requirements are satisfied gratis from the public consumption funds, for example, medical services and others, cannot be overlooked.

Since January 1, 1980, by decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers and pursuing the aim of making more extensive use of pensioners' labour in the country's economy, increments to pensions for those continuing to work after reaching the pensionable age have been introduced. Working pensioners are now granted the choice of drawing a pension while working or, carrying on for a period of one to four years without getting a pension, to acquire the right of increasing it by increments for each year of work after retirement age. The corresponding Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has been published.

Invalids of the Great Patriotic War who work after retiring on old-age pension are entitled a 100 per cent pension, irrespective of the place of work, provided the pension and wages together do not exceed 300 roubles a month. Material incentives to stimulate retired servicemen to work have also been increased.

Pensioners on part-time jobs enjoy the same privileges as workers and employees on full-day and full-week jobs. Heads of enterprises and organisations in production and services are authorised to give old-age pensioners, with the agreement of the trade union committees, holidays without pay, according to their wishes, for a period of up to two months.

It must be noted that for people, including servicemen, to enjoy full benefits of the existing social security system in a socialist society, they

don't have to contribute anything from their wages or salaries, as is the case in capitalist countries.

Pension provision for servicemen—officers, praporshchiks, mitchmans and extended servicemen—is implemented according to the rulings and rates fixed by the USSR Council of Ministers. This includes long service and disability pensions and pensions for families of servicemen who have lost their breadwinner. Servicemen also have several additional privileges, including a retirement age privilege.

Service pensions are given to those who, on the day of being transferred to the reserve or retirement, have a service record of 25 years. Officers remain on active service: junior lieutenants, lieutenants, senior lieutenants, captains and corresponding ranks until the age of 40; colonels and captains 1st rank until 50; generals and admirals until 55-60. When necessary officers may be kept on active service, according to a ruling of the USSR Council of Ministers, for 5 years above the above-mentioned ages.

Discharge from active service before the term expires is permissible on grounds of health or of redundancy. Moreover, officers who have reached the age of 40 and served 20 years in the armed forces are also entitled to long service pensions. For officers discharged directly from service in flight crews and on submarines and in some other cases, service pensions are fixed irrespective of age.

Members of a serviceman's family, who have lost their breadwinner and were dependent on a person who died, was killed or missing (during military operations), are entitled to a pension. As an exception, a pension can be awarded to grown-up children and incapacitated parents, even if they were not dependent on the deceased, but were subsequently deprived of the source of their means of subsistence.

All servicemen are entitled to disability pensions if incapacitation ensued during the period of service or before the expiry of three months since the day of discharge or after that period, but as a result of injuries, contusion or illness during the service itself. There are increments to pensions for care of invalids of the 1st and 2nd groups and to invalids of the same groups who are not able to work because they have to support incapacitated members of their families.

Special attention is paid to invalids of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). In accordance with the decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Additional Measures to Improve Living Conditions of the Great Patriotic War Participants" as from May 1, 1980, the following additional privileges are granted:

to invalids of 1st and 2nd groups the right of free travel by rail and river transport on transit and suburban routes once a year (there and back);

to invalids of 3rd group and their dependents 50 per cent discount on rent and established costs for use of heating, water mains, gas and electricity and to those who live in houses without central heating 50 per cent discount on the cost of fuel purchased according to the norms established for sale to the population;

to invalids of 3rd group exemption from income tax on their salaries irrespective of the sum;

to invalids of 1st and 2nd groups, other ranks, sergeants, praporshchiks and mitchmans of active and extended service 10 per cent increase of their invalidity pensions (within the limits of the established maximum rates).

The minimum pensions for invalids of the Great Patriotic War 3rd group, other ranks, are increased from 33 to 40 roubles a month.

Participants of the Civil and the Great Patriotic wars and other combat operations in defence of the USSR who served in military units, staffs and establishments as part of armies in the field and partisan detachments are granted 50 per cent discount on income tax on their wages, and will have priority in receiving an apartment.

The right to receive interest-free loans for building individual dwelling-houses, formerly provided only to war disabled, now applies to all who took part in the war.

In order to provide better facilities for rest and medical treatment to Great Patriotic War veterans, it is envisaged to grant them current holidays at a time convenient to them and, when necessary, they may take an additional two weeks, but without wages. When a veteran retires on a well-deserved rest he continues to receive medical aid at the polyclinic where he was registered while working. He is also entitled to precedence when applying for accommodation at a sanatorium or rest home.

Other privileges for pensioners are also envisaged. As you see, great attention is paid in Soviet socialist society to former front-line soldiers and all servicemen as regards their material and social welfare. They are surrounded with particular affection and care.

In his reminiscences "Malaya Zemlya" L. I. Brezhnev wrote: "And today, many years after those battles, it is our duty, no matter how many other things may occupy our time, to always remember the war veterans. They deserve every care and consideration, they should be helped in their day-to-day lives. This is something our government bodies and all our citizens are morally obliged to do. It is one of the laws that guides our life."

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AIR FORCES

NAVIGATIONAL TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 18-19

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Lt Gen Air Force V. Bulanov, Chief Navigator of the Soviet Air Force, Merited Military Navigator of the USSR: "Airmen's Navigation Skill"]

[Text]

AS UNDERSTOOD today, an airman's navigation proficiency is a combination of knowledge of relevant theory with skill in flying an aircraft, seeking out and homing on ground, sea, and air targets, delivering bombing and missile attacks, and carrying out air reconnaissance missions in various conditions. Navigation is a major factor contributing to combat readiness of a pilot, a crew or an air unit.

A flight on a set course for a combat mission requires the airman to pay constant attention to control of the aircraft (flying techniques), to continually check on his position by reading numerous navigational instruments, and to solve complicated logical problems in his head. To cope with such a set of actions, the airman must possess to a high degree the above-mentioned navigator's knowledge and skill.

The chief thing for the navigator is to maintain the course both in time and in position. In the early days of flying, the air navigator relied largely on visual orientation. This method of orientation, along with "dead-reckoning," is as old as aviation itself.

The modern period is characterised by a qualitatively new level in the development of aviation science and technology. The main trend in improving the present-day navigation aids is the development of integrated navigation systems allowing a high degree of precision in steering the aircraft on a set course. Moreover, basically new navigation and automatic flight control systems are now coming into use, which permit automatic flight and landing under adverse weather conditions, by day and by night.

Yet visual orientation has not lost its importance even now, in the age of automatic navigation and flight control systems. Air crews of all types and branches of aviation still use visual orientation to a varying degree. However, visual orientation, particularly at low altitudes, now presents greater difficulties due to increased flying speeds and decreased time for observing landmarks.

Air units are continually experimenting to study the factors contributing to reliable visual orientation and to provide suitable recommendations for conversion crews. Thus, airmen are advised to spend more time studying flight maps, selecting the appropriate scale and marking prominent landmarks on the maps.

A high standard of navigational proficiency cannot be attained unless the airman is familiar with the area of intended operations (flights), and also with the conditions, rules and procedures of visual orientation and lookout. Airmen must therefore study salient area and line references on the terrain, their distinguishing features and what use can be made of them in navigation or combat, etc.

Besides, prior to each flight, airmen trace the front line on the map, locate the zones of special flight conditions and alternate airfields, and study the facilities and flight procedures existing at the airfields.

Furthermore, a high navigation standard implies that the airman should possess a flawless flying technique on any course in various meteorological and navigational situations and the ability to keep strictly to the prescribed flying conditions, etc. Needless to say that he should be proficient in the use of integrated navigation systems,

in air reconnaissance and target search and in accurately engaging the targets with gun fire, missiles and air bombs.

The modern technical devices permit complete automation of piloting, navigation and combat operations, leaving the pilot the job of controlling the working of the on-board equipment and changing the flight program. Still, an airman who does not know the operational, design and performance characteristics of the systems and facilities, the requirements of the pertinent flight manuals and the symptoms of malfunctioning of the basic equipment, or is unable to use the alternate instruments for solving flight problems cannot utilise the capabilities of these devices to the full in flight. The airman must therefore thoroughly study the available equipment with a view to further improving the methods of its employment, increasing the precision of air navigation and, hence ensuring greater success of flight missions.

To fully utilise the capabilities of integrated navigation systems in flight, the pilot must, first of all, learn the location, frequencies, time and operation specifics of the ground-based radio installations. Navigation skills are perfected in the course of special classes and training periods in classrooms, on simulators and in the aircraft cockpit. When preparing for flights, the pilots also receive navigational training. They study the flying area, prepare the flight maps, collect the requisite reference data, brush up their knowledge and improve their practical skills, perform navigational calculations using various navigation devices and items of the navigator's personal equipment, and check on the readiness of the aircraft navigation equipment for flight.

In organising navigation training in an air regiment or squadron, especially for young pilots, the correct choice of the topics, the order in which they are dealt with and the procedures used for consolidating already acquired knowledge by practice lessons and drills are of no mean importance. No detailed recommendations can be given here since pilot and navigator training has its specifics with different branches of aviation, depending on the missions to be performed and the equipment available. Much depends on the experience already gained. It is only natural that air school graduates should be given more attention. Their theoretical knowledge is usually good, but they lack practical experience, skills and ability to act with precision in complicated situations.

Teaching methods and techniques should vary with different categories of officers. While the experienced pilot or navigator may be recommended to study a particular topic independently, the

novice will require special coaching by his element commander, instructor or a more experienced comrade.

Sometimes, one hears pilots, especially young ones, ask why, since modern ground-based and airborne equipment for navigation, combat employment and crew control allows operational mission flights to be carried out and navigational problems to be solved automatically, without human intervention, spend so much time learning the navigation? It is evident that the present-day level of aviation equipment and its constant further improvement assure high precision, reliability and safety of air navigation. But this is only true in normal conditions and training flights, while the airmen train for combat and for action in situations where they can rely only on their knowledge and skills. So airmen must train for combat now, and this training should be persistent and uninterrupted so that no contingency due to malfunctioning of a system, jamming or unusual flight conditions will find them unprepared.

Such an approach to the airmen's training requires commanders and navigators of air units and subunits to work out detailed and flexible training programs, to exercise strict supervision over the pilots' navigation training and to always have an eye to their training standards.

At an exercise, when the land forces were about to cross a water obstacle, a tactical landing group had to be dropped behind the "enemy" lines. The weather conditions were unfavourable. The commander needed to have confidence in the skills of his subordinates to decide to put the helicopters in the air and lead them to the battle area.

The helicopters air-lifting the group flew at the lowest permissible altitude, "feeling their way" in extremely poor visibility. They appeared all of a sudden over the attacking forces and then disappeared immediately in the milk-white fog in the direction of the opposite bank. The landing group, dropped at the right time and in the right spot, decided the outcome of the battle. The crossing was a success, the "enemy" defences were pierced.

No doubt, the commanding officer was taking a risk. But this risk was reasonable, based on the high navigation proficiency of his subordinates and their good experience of repeated flights in similar conditions.

Flying modern aircraft makes increasingly stringent demands on the airman's ability to assess his readiness for flights. Today it is not enough for the airman to apply himself during the planned classes and the hours allotted to flight prepara-

tion, he must also continually train on his own, outside the classroom. To this end, units and sub-units provide airmen with specially equipped classrooms, diverse trainers and simulators, and a variety of special publications and instruction manuals.

However, top priority in making the pilot an excellent navigator goes to the flights for practising various navigation tasks. They test the airman's theoretical knowledge, consolidate the skills he acquired on ground and allow him to work out and polish up optimum solutions to navigation problems.

An important function of navigation is to enhance flight safety. This is achieved through a purposeful training of the flying personnel aimed at preventing loss of orientation, dangerous closure and collision of aircraft with ground obstacles and with each other, flight into prohibited zones and zones with dangerous meteorological conditions, and violation of the prescribed conditions of flight.

To conclude, navigational skill is unattainable without hard everyday work on the ground and in the air, a good theoretical background and practical skills in solving navigation problems, all of which reduce the time required to prepare for a combat flight and ensure its success.

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AIR FORCES

POST-FLIGHT CRITIQUES IN PILOT TRAINING

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 34-35

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Col M. Igumentsev, Military Pilot 1st Class: "Post-Flight Critique"]

[Text]

The lieutenant was listening attentively to the instructor, as if weighing his every word. The instructor was explaining the cause of the airman's mistakes in piloting the aircraft.

"Look what happens," he was saying. "You increase the revs while the aircraft is still in a vertical dive. The speed sharply grows and exceeds the designated one near the horizon."

The instructor further explained that in entering a vertical manoeuvre the pilot pulled the stick sharply backwards, thereby creating excessive g-load. As a result, the speed dropped quickly to become lower than the manoeuvring speed* of the highest point. In this situation the pilot is unable to perform the Immelmann turn due to lack of control power.

"Please pay serious attention to flying technique," the instructor concluded. "On the whole your flight to the flying area was satisfactory."

The analysis was a short one, but all the instructor's observations were to the point.

Post-flight critique is an effective form of airman's training, during which the results of a flying shift are summarised, the airman's performance evaluated, advanced experience generalised and disseminated, and mistakes discussed. The critique also discloses the shortcomings in planning, organising and executing flights, in flight-operations support and in servicing, and outlines measures to be taken to avoid flying accidents.

Air Force units and subunits regularly hold three types of critique: inter-flight, preliminary and complete, each having its own peculiarities.

The inter-flight critique is conducted by the commander or instructor immediately upon fulfilment of the assignment by the pilot, its main purpose being to find out the causes of the mistakes made. Such a critique is indispensable for mastering new aircraft equipment and the methods of its combat use and manoeuvring, and also for working up new and more complicated missions.

The trainee's report on the fulfilment of the assignment is a very important component of airmen's training. Not a single element of the flight or actions in a specific situation must escape the commander's or instructor's attention. With his considerable experience and knowledge, he seeks to disclose the errors and determine their causes without delay. The in-flight monitoring data at his disposal enable him to hold a purposeful critique, which helps the trainee to avoid mistakes in the future.

If a pilot makes a serious mistake, the commander has an additional lesson with him in the aircraft cockpit, striving to eliminate completely any possible causes of the mistake. In the event of totally unsatisfactory performance of the flight mission, he assigns another sortie on a dual-control machine. Debarring a pilot from flights is an extreme step.

Once a pilot failed to bring the aircraft to the preset landing angle during landing approach. The commander was obliged to debar him from flights. In the evening an aircraft was hoisted by an aircraft lifting jack; the pilot, sitting in the cockpit, tried to memorise better the machine's position relative to the horizon. On the next flying shift he was assigned two familiarisation flights on a dual-control aircraft followed by a check flight, after

* Maximum permissible flying speed in aerobatics.

which he was given permission to perform an independent flight.

On another occasion the commander asked a pilot how he had carried out interception. The pilot replied evasively that everything had been more or less all right except that there was something wrong with the sight. The commander thoroughly analysed the in-flight monitoring data and came to the conclusion that the pilot had no reason whatsoever to blame the sight; in reality he had failed to keep to the preset interception parameters. The commander reprimanded his subordinate and explained to him the causes of his mistakes.

The preliminary critique is conducted by the unit commander at the end of the flying shift. It is also attended by the unit's command personnel and chiefs of services, the flying control officer and representatives of the command personnel of supporting units and subunits. The unit commander listens to their reports, evaluates the work of the services and the flying control group, and makes a brief summary.

The chief material for the preliminary critique is the pilots' mistakes revealed during the flying shift. These mistakes are duly recorded in the relevant documents. It depends on the level of organisation of the flights, the proficiency and principledness of commanders whether full and objective account is taken of the remarks made.

In a squadron the preliminary critique is conducted by the squadron commander on the start area immediately after the end of the flights.

The efficiency of any kind of critique is considerably enhanced if it is held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and frankness in analysing both successes and failures. The commander's proficiency in method is also of great value.

A parallel aim of the preliminary critique is to collect data for the complete critique.

The complete critique is the most exhaustive one. It is generally held at unit and sometimes at squadron level. It is organised on the day following the flights or after two successive flying shifts. Test instrumentation data thoroughly analysed by specialists are presented for the critique. The commander is enabled to assess objectively the qualitative indicators of each sortie and to analyse the most characteristic mistakes of all pilots, the shortcomings in the work of the air engineering service and of supporting subunits. Mistakes and their causes are deeply analysed from the theoretical point of view.

When a potential cause of accident arises in flight, a special diagram is drawn for analysis at the critique. It shows flight conditions at the moment the error was made, and test instrumentation data.

To analyse pilots' actions during takeoff and landing, wide use is made of films and tape recordings of crews' conversations with the command post. The recordings help to reproduce the air situation, establish the sequence of the crew members' actions, learn their reaction to changes in the situation and their psychological condition when the situation is made more complicated. Systematic and purposeful medical checkups and personal contacts with the flight medical officer enable the commander to form an objective opinion of the pilots' spirits, their health in general and their physical condition at any given moment of the flight.

During the critique the airmen are given the opportunity to analyse their actions independently. Objectivity and self-criticism help them to reconstruct the entire flight from takeoff to landing, and to analyse the causes of mistakes in detail.

It is evident that a well-organised and skilfully conducted critique is an indispensable condition for further improving airmen's proficiency and enhancing the combat readiness of units and subunits.

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GROUND FORCES

DEVELOPING COMBAT TEAMWORK

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 20-21

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Col V. Buyar: "Smooth Working in Battle"]

[Text]

THE SITUATION of the exercise was very complicated. The "enemy" leaning upon a tactically advantageous hill, had built strong defences, installed obstacles before the FEBA and organised a flexible and dense fire system. A battalion under Major L. Shostak had the task of breaking through these defences and capturing a strong point. Efficiently cooperating with tanks and artillery the infantrymen made skillful use of the accidents of the terrain, delivered accurate fire at the targets and were advancing further and further into the depth of the defences.

At that moment the "enemy" attempted to seize the initiative and launched a counterattack. But it failed. On the command of Major Shostak the artillerymen fired a barrage before the forward edge of the counterattacking "enemy" and one of the companies reached the threatened line and captured an advantageous position. Thus the battalion CO succeeded in covering the subunit against an "enemy" flank blow.

The battalion's main forces, according to the decision of Major Shostak, carried out a manoeuvre under a smoke screen and attacked the "enemy" flank. This was the culminating point of the exercise, during which the battalion CO successfully coped with the assigned mission.

Let us compare the actions of the neighbouring subunit under similar conditions. The only difference was that here the "enemy" managed to take advantage of uncoordinated actions of the infantrymen.

Here is what happened. The company which had been ordered to beat off the "enemy" counterattack by fire from a stationary position was late in reaching the appointed line and came under heavy "enemy" fire. The company could not redeploy its battle order in good time and was late in carrying out the manoeuvre.

How can one explain this? The fact is that the conditions under which both subunits acted, were approximately the same, and yet the result in one case was the opposite of the other.

The reason was that the infantrymen of the first battalion quickly responded to the instructions, commands and signals given by the commander, carried them out with precision and in concert in a complicated situation. They displayed precisely those qualities which are implied in the term "smooth working."

Smooth working is based on excellent training standard of every soldier, sergeant and officer separately and the entire subunit, the ability of sections, platoons and companies to fulfill irreproachably the various instructions and commands. It is rightly considered that unit team-work is one of the main indicators of field training. The smooth working required in contemporary warfare can be achieved only in the process of well-organised training in tactics, firing, technical drills, physical exercises, driving combat vehicles, etc. The first factor which influences the degree of subunits' team-work is the ability of the personnel to make the utmost use of the capabilities of weapons and combat equipment. It is easy to understand that soldiers who have mastered their armament well will act confidently and courageously in any situation and will not spoil the subunit's smooth working.

Indispensable conditions for achieving a smooth working are confident actions of the personnel, their psychological stability. Development of such qualities in the personnel depends to a great extent on organisation and logistic support of exercises.

By its saturation, dynamism and complexity these exercises must reflect the character of a contemporary all-

arms battle, create a training situation as close as possible to real combat actions. And here the practice of tanks driving over the personnel and use of incendiaries at exercises have fully proved their worth.

Smooth working in modern conditions is also characterised by the time factor. In contemporary battle it acquires paramount significance. Therefore during exercises missions must be carried out in a limited time. Lessons and training periods are conducted within the standards established for each speciality. The use of norms of exercises ensures constant growth of the men's combat standard and skill.

Interchangeability plays an important role in a unit smooth working. Here is a case in point. During an exercise an artillery battery was repulsing an attack by "enemy" tanks. According to the narrative the commander on one of the guns was disabled. But the artillerymen did not lose their heads. The gun-layer took the place of the commander. The loader carried out the duties of the gun-layer and was replaced by the driver. Rhythm and smoothness were not broken. Shells continued scoring direct hits. All this became possible due to full interchangeability of the crew, high skill of all the men.

Physical tempering is of great importance for achieving smooth working of a unit. It is a known fact that as methods of combat actions become more complicated physical strain on the man also increases. Let us take firing as an example. To fire continuously for ten minutes it is necessary to carry nearly a ton of ammunition. An ammunition carrier who is not physically fit will not be able to ensure a high rate of firing. As a result, the smooth working of not only one crew but the whole subunit will be disrupted and this can lead to failure to carry out the mission. There are special exercises to develop the man's physical standard. Artillerymen and tankmen, for example, practise with dummy shells weighing as much as live ones.

How do commanders secure smooth working of the unit on the level required today?

The practice of army combat training testifies that primary skills of smooth working are developed in the process of individual training. In such training the servicemen study, first of all, their duties. Then they continue improving their skills in the crew or section. Thus, from their very first steps in the service the men accustom themselves to the collective and well-coordinated actions.

As a whole individual training is planned and carried out so as to enhance the subunit's combat readiness. For example, during lessons in tactics the men first of all study general duties of servicemen in battle. Then they work up the methods and actions in the offensive and defensive as required by the men's speciality and the conditions of the situation. As a rule, at the first exercises these conditions are not very complicated. But eventually they become more complicated.

In individual training, every soldier's actions are subordinated to the fulfilment of some common mission, to the achievement of some ultimate result. This is how the elements of the unit's smooth working are achieved.

For example, when the elements of movement on the battlefield are being worked up, smooth working is achieved by ensuring the strict sequence of movements of the men and their mutual fire support. For this purpose it is necessary, first of all, to point out who begins the movement and how, who stays where he is and how the actions of comrades are covered by fire. Later on all this is done in practice.

The next stage of unit smooth working begins by practising the actions as part of a section, crew, platoon or company. This is usually achieved in the process of tactical-marching drill, tactical exercises and manoeuvres. We deal with only tactical-drill exercises, which are the main form of training to achieve unit smooth working.

Work on a theme usually begins by the subunit commander mastering its content. While studying the topic of the forthcoming exercises, he determines its main questions, marks the sequence and methods of working them up. The volume and quality of the previously worked up problems are taken into consideration.

The tactical situation is thought out in all its details during the preparatory period. For tactical and drill exercises it is made such as it can be in battle conditions. For this purpose mainly training fields with different engineer installations are used. Simulators to be used are also foreseen beforehand.

In the area of the exercises the men are acquainted with the tactical situation and then proceed to work up the training questions. This begins with the explanation of the way this or that element is carried out. Then there is a demonstration. The movement studied is carried out first as a whole and then by elements. At the same time the ways of achieving precision and smoothness of actions by men, sections and platoons are explained.

The working up of this or that element begins, as a rule, at slow speed. This is done so as the fighting men will firmly master the order of actions in carrying out normatives, understand their role in the subunit's mission. During this time the commander checks the fulfilment of technique, coordination of the actions. Later, as they master the element, the speed is increased and is brought up to the established standard.

When an element or task has been performed two or three times, a separate critique is made of it. The mistakes made are pointed out and also how to correct them. This order is preserved during the entire exercise.

Such a method makes it possible to establish how well the men have mastered the topics on various subjects, and how firm are the skills of the commanders in organising and controlling their subordinates. Besides it allows the commanders to determine controllability of subunits, their ability to fulfil the commands quickly and accurately, instructions and signals of the commanders and also the smooth working of the men as a part of sections, platoons or companies.

The concluding stage of a tactical and marching drill exercise is a critique. Practice shows that the further growth of the servicemen's skill and smooth working of

the unit depends to a great extent on how skilfully the critique of the exercise is carried out and how mistakes made are revealed. At the critique the level of smooth working is pointed out for each training question. There is thorough analysis of the mistakes made and the means of avoiding them in the future. Such critiques are illustrated, as a rule, by examples from the Great Patriotic War or tactical exercises. It is shown to what results incorrect actions may lead in conditions of battle and what must be done so that the skills acquired in handling weaponry and combat equipment will promote greater unit smooth working.

Good smooth working of subunits is achieved in everyday combat training, the effectiveness and good quality of which depend on organisation, logistic support and skillful carrying out of the exercise.

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GROUND FORCES

TANK UNIT CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT TACTICS

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 24-25

(Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Maj A. Yakubovskiy (Yakubovsky): "The Mystery of the 'Blue' Forest")

[Text]

STORM, Storm! Birch calling! Suddenly counterattacked from the 'Blue' Forest. Suffering losses, passing over to defence..." reported the commander of the right-flank battalion.

"Are tanks attacking too?"

"No, only infantry supported by helicopters."

Even by the battalion commander's voice, distorted as it was by interferences, you could see that the situation there was very difficult.

"Another counterattack from the same direction!" the regimental commander exclaimed. "How on earth did the 'enemy' manage to get such a force there?"

The chief of staff shrugged his shoulders. "Reconnaissance reported that there's nothing there but small groups of infantry," he said. "It's strange that their tank battalion doesn't take part in the counterattacks..."

They bent over the map again. The situation gave food for thought. It had changed so radically that plans and battle orders had to be altered during the course of the operation. Nobody could have expected such stubborn resistance from a wood where the "enemy" defences had been reported to be weakest.

Meanwhile subunit commanders' reports showed that the "enemy" was determined to prevent a breakthrough of his defences at any cost. The more vigorously we attacked, the more obstinate was "enemy" resistance, the more vicious his fire. Apparently in the "Blue" Forest was concealed some installation or position which the enemy was resolutely holding on to. The regimental commander racked his brains, turning over in his mind one version after another. But much was yet to be cleared up. He was increasingly troubled by the idea that the "enemy" had guessed the attackers' intention and managed to regroup his forces undetected to frustrate all attempts at exploiting the success.

The commander was strongly tempted to commit his reserves as soon as possible. And in another direction, far

from the area where the "battle" was raging. Then he could count on success.

Weighing all the pros and cons, the regimental commander could not help thinking about the "enemy" tank battalion which seemed to have vanished into thin air. He had every reason to suppose that this battalion would deal an unexpected blow as soon as the reserves were committed to action.

It flashed through his mind that the tank battalion in question might well be hiding in the forest.

He sharply turned to the chief of staff. "Call Senior Lieutenant Zhiganov, quick!" he said.

When Zhiganov came the commander motioned him to the table.

"The fighting is on this line," he said, tracing a line on the map between the two hills behind which lay the "Blue" Forest. "The 'enemy' is stubbornly defending it. Your mission is to find out what's in the forest."

He was silent for a moment, then asked: "What if the 'enemy' has set a trap for us? He might have organised a strong defence system here and is now waiting for us to commit our reserves. Imagine what would happen if we swallowed the bait?"

Zhiganov realised only too well that if that was the "enemy's" aim, he would first try to exhaust the attackers and then deal a crushing blow, most probably with the tank battalion whose whereabouts were still unknown.

When they came in sight of the forest, Zhiganov ordered the driver-mechanic to stop. The IFV sharply turned to the right and stopped several metres short of thick bushes stretching in a dark green strip all along a hill which commanded a perfect view of the terrain below.

Zhiganov jumped out and looked around. A rivulet with dry sloping banks flowed on the right and a smooth-driven dirt road ran on the left. Some seven or eight hundred metres away, behind a wide strip of stubble and the bushes adjoining the road stretched the "Blue" Forest. The quiet was almost alarming.

Suddenly Zhiganov heard a rumble of engines which gradually grew louder. A few moments later a column of vehicles appeared around the bend. Driving up to the hill, they turned off the road and headed for the forest. It seemed that in a moment the vehicles would disappear behind the trees. But presently a soldier in black overalls and a tankman's headset emerged from the forest. Waving a red signal flag resolutely, he ordered the column to stop. An officer jumped out of the front vehicle and came up to the tankman who was pointing to the hill and explaining something. The column turned round and drove back.

Zhiganov wondered. The column commander must have either lost his bearings or just decided to take a short cut. At any rate it was clear now that the forest was guarded; there was something important there.

In his mind's eye Zhiganov saw again the tankman and his resolute gestures during his talk with the column chief. Why had the "enemy" organised a post in the forest? Could it possibly conceal the tank battalion? The idea was tempting but had to be checked at once.

Having assessed the situation, Zhiganov decided to penetrate into the forest on the side where the rivulet flowed. The bushes which covered its banks allowed one to approach quite close and, which was particularly important, undetected. True, precious time had to be spent on the turning movement, but there was no other way out.

Zhiganov left the vehicle and the driver in a thick undergrowth and went deep into the forest accompanied by two reconnaissance men. Though the footpaths were narrow and overgrown and bushes made large sectors almost impassable, the forest was not so wild and untrodden as it seemed from a distance. Here and there one could see abandoned and overgrown trenches for trucks, tanks and APCs, caved-in slit-trenches and heaps of dried fir branches such as are generally used for tent flooring.

Taking utmost care not to break the silence of the forest, Zhiganov led his men towards the spot where he had seen the tankman.

A little while later he and his men saw three tanks in a small ravine; they were placed so as to be able to hold

the road under aimed fire. "This must be an ambush," the Senior Lieutenant thought. "But where are the rest of them?" Although he had only discovered one platoon, Zhiganov was nevertheless satisfied. Now he felt sure that the platoon belonged to the battalion they were searching for. This gave him hope of success.

The deeper the scouts went into the forest, the more firmly they were convinced that the tank battalion was somewhere near. The forest road was scarred by tank tracks. Here and there at narrow places trees had been uprooted. In short, everything showed that a large tank column had passed there not long before.

Suddenly Sergeant Krasnov, who was leading the way, raised his hand calling for attention. In a moment Zhiganov was behind him. "What's the matter?" By way of an answer the sergeant pointed ahead. The senior Lieutenant took a careful look. Some twenty metres in front of them was the parapet of a trench like the ones they had already seen. But unlike the others, this one contained a tank whose oblong turret, long gun barrel and flexible wireless rod protruded above ground level.

"There are two more on the right," Krasnov whispered. Zhiganov had already seen them too. The tanks stood in trenches some ten metres off the road, camouflaged with branches. Looking at the tanks, Zhiganov mentally complimented the "enemy" on their foresight. The tanks were difficult to detect and could leave the area at short notice, for the road was close at hand.

Bypassing the tanks on the left, the scouts proceeded to inspect the forest. Very soon any remaining doubts as to the tank battalion's location disappeared altogether. It was located in companies along the road. Simple calculations showed that it would not take the tanks more than ten minutes to leave the area, advance to a tactically advantageous line and launch an attack.

Having marked the location of the tanks on the map, Zhiganov was about to start back. Suddenly he stumbled over something. He bent down and saw a cable laid in the thick grass. They followed it.

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GROUND FORCES

T-62 TANK DESCRIBED

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 26-28

[Article, under the heading "Weapons and Equipment", by Col Eng D. Ryazantsev:
"The T-62 Tank"]

(Text)

Zhiganov strained his ear to catch any sound of vehicles in the distance. But everything was quiet.

Gradually the forest began to thin out. A spacious glade bordered by young pine trees opened up ahead. A narrow little used road ran along the middle of it and disappeared among the trees. Tiny bushy firs timidly peeped out of the high grass. In the centre of the glade, on both sides of the road, islets of hazel-nut bushes showed green.

Zhiganov's keen eye instantly discerned a few staff vehicles concealed there in an equilateral triangle. A light-green camouflage net stretched out above them swayed gently in the breeze. A little way off the outlines of self-propelled guns could be seen in the thick foliage.

This was really a good luck! Zhiganov had not expected to come across an "enemy" command post here. He had thought that the cable would lead them to a subunit's position or to another sentry post.

He mentally congratulated himself on his success and led his group back, eager to get the data obtained to headquarters as soon as possible. Suddenly one of the scouts stopped and pointed to a tank camouflaged in a trench. At first Zhiganov saw nothing suspicious about it. But then, taking several steps aside, he realised what was wrong. The turret protruding above the earthen parapet looked somewhat unusual. It was smaller than those firmly imprinted on Zhiganov's memory; the gun barrel too looked rather suspicious; it hung as limply as an empty sleeve.

"Why, they are inflatable dummies!" The realisation made his flesh creep. They were so skilfully made and camou-

flaged that could have easily misled anybody. But for the air leakage in one of them, Zhiganov would surely have taken them for real tanks.

This discovery played havoc with all his assumptions regarding the "enemy" plan. Zhiganov tried to take a new view of the situation. Obviously the "enemy" wanted to mislead the attackers as to his real intentions and stubbornly defended the approaches to the forest to make them believe it concealed some important installation. Admitting the likelihood of the attackers' reconnaissance appearing in the forest, the "enemy" had prepared a dummy concentration area for a tank battalion. And to make things look more convincing, he had simulated a CP not far from it. In reality the battalion had withdrawn long ago, leaving behind as a bait several tanks, a ratty road and trees knocked down at sharp turns — indisputable evidence of his presence there.

Putting all these details together, Zhiganov mentally praised the "enemy" on their resourcefulness. They had very nearly succeeded in their plan, which consisted in making the attackers change the direction of the attack when they encountered stubborn resistance near the forest, and commit their reserves. It could really have happened...

Thinking about all this, Zhiganov switched on his radio. "Storm, storm! Thunder calling! There's a dummy tank concentration area in the forest," he reported to the regimental commander.

The mystery of the "Blue" Forest was solved.

The T-62 tank has a powerful armament, reliable armour protection and high manoeuvrability. It is equipped with a gun twinned with a 7.62-mm machine gun and a 12.7-mm AA machine gun. The gun is equipped with sighting instruments and laying devices.

The vehicle also has special devices to protect its crew from the shock wave of atomic explosions and from radioactive dust. Thanks to its underwater driving equipment the tank can negotiate a river on the bed.

The smoke generators for putting out smoke screens and the fire-fighting equipment available in the tanks also contribute to their reliability.

The four-men crew consists of the commander, a driver, a gunner and a loader. The tank driver's seat is in the driver's compartment and the rest of the crew are in the fighting compartment.

The T-62 general characteristics are as follows: weight, 37 tons, engine power, 580 h.p.; mean specific ground pressure, 0.75 kgf/cm²; clearance, 430 mm; maximum road speed, 50 km/h.

The T-62 possesses the following cross-country capacity: maximum climbing ability, 32 degrees; maximum healing angle, 30 degrees; maximum width and depth of negotiable ditch, 2.85 m and 0.8 m respectively; fording depth, 1.4 m.

The main component parts of the T-62 tank are armoured hull and turret, armament, engine, transmission, running gear, electrical equipment, communication facilities and nuclear protection system. The tank also carries a set of spares, tool and accessories.

Its armoured hull is divided into a driver's compartment, a fighting compartment and an engine compartment.

The driver's compartment (see Fig), which is positioned in the hull nose, accommodates a driver's seat, planetary steering gear levers and fuel feed pedal. Located on the upper sloping plate in front of the driver's seat are clutch and stopping brake pedals and direction indicator. On the driver's right is a battery rack above which the instrument panel and electrical instruments are mounted. Also on the driver's right on the hull floor are the fuel-switch cock, a fuel-feed pump, gear shift gate and gear shift lever, a drinking water tank, a portable fire extinguisher and a box containing a TVN-2 vision device.

Located on the hull on the driver's left are the manual fuel feed lever, speedometer, shutters control linkage, electropneumatic valves incorporated in the driver's vision equipment cleaning system, engine clutch hydropneumatic control system and air starting system; compressed air cylinders and reduction gear.

Above the driver's seat in the hull roof is the driver's hatch in front of which are two vision devices.

Two fuel tanks serving as racks and a nose fuel tank are installed between the battery rack and the right side of the hull.

Behind the driver's seat are a tool box secured to the hull floor and the emergency escape hatch.

The fighting compartment occupying the middle part of the tank hull and the turret houses the armament and communication facilities. The commander's back seat and the gunner's seat are located on the left of the gun.

In front of the gunner's seat are the control panel, turret-traversing mechanism with a direction indicator and daylight and night sights. Above the tank commander's seat on the top of the turret there is the commander's cupola with a hatch enclosing four prismatic vision devices and one combined instrument both for day and night usage.

In addition, the fighting compartment accommodates ammunition stowage, cartridge belt boxes, instruments and units of the stabiliser. On the right of the gun is the loader's folding seat attached to the rotating turret bracket. Above this seat in the turret top is a hatch with a vision device in front of it.

The engine compartment is located in the rear of the hull and separated from the fighting compartment by an airtight bulkhead. It accommodates the following equipment: engine, air cooler, centrifuge MTs-1, smoke generator pumping unit, gear reduction unit, engine clutch, gearbox with compressor, planetary steering gear, cooling fan, oil tank, oil separator, ADU-2s automatic pressure control, carbon dioxide cylinders, shafts of both planetary steering gear and engine clutch and vertical shaft of the gearbox control linkage. Installed on the gear reduction unit housing is an electric starter and mounted above the gearbox and planetary steering gear are the water and oil coolers.

The armoured roof above the water cooler carries inlet shutters and the rear beam outlet shutters.

On both sides of the tank hull are mounted final drives, driving, road and idler wheels and tracks. The racks above tracks carry external fuel tanks, towing ropes, boxes of material and tools, tow rings, warning devices, spare track shoes, case of spare parts for the gun, reserve oil tank and so on.

Welded to the upper front armour plate are two towing hooks, a light illuminating the TVN-2

night vision device, and a blackout headlight. On the front of the turret are two lights for illuminating the night sight and the commander's vision device and another light of the TVN-2 night vision device. The turret rear has a port through which the air is sucked in by a compressor, a dust exhaust port and a cartridge case ejection opening with cover.

The hull rear mounts brackets used to secure fuel drums, self-recovery logs and a snorkel.

The tank turret rests on a wide support provided on the hull roof. Both the tank hull and the turret are shaped so as to ensure the most rational use of their space and reliable armour protection.

The gun twinned with the 7.62-mm machine gun is installed in the tank turret, its shield carrying an extractor mechanism.

Laying of the gun and the machine gun twinned with it may be effected with a type TSh telescopic hinged sight, a TPN-1 night sight, a longitudinal level and an azimuth indicator and also with the use of manual electric control and elevator power drives.

The tank is designed to accommodate the ammunition stowage for AK submachine gun, signal pistol and hand grenade stowages as well as racks for shells and cartridge belt boxes.

The turret houses the main units and instruments of the stabiliser whose electrohydraulic system automatically maintains both the desired position of the gun and the machine gun during

traverse and elevation guidance when the tank is in motion and the target designation data for traverse guidance specified by the tank commander.

The tank armament also includes sighting and vision instruments.


The T-62 tank is equipped with V-55 engine. This is a 12-cylinder V-diesel, four-stroke, high-speed, airless-injection, liquid-cooled engine. It develops a maximum power of 580 hp at 2,000 rpm.

The conditions of engine operation are: cooling liquid temperature, 70-90°C, a short-duration temperature rise to 105°C being permissible; oil temperature, 70-90°C and 110°C respectively; oil pressure, 6-10 kgf/cm² in stable conditions and at least 2 kgf/cm² in most irregular mode of operation; engine speed, 1,600-1,900 rpm.

The transmission is located in the rear of the engine compartment. It includes gear reduction unit, engine clutch, gearbox, two planetary steering gears, two final drives, fan and compressor drives.

The engine torque is transmitted through the reduction gear unit to the engine clutch and thence to the gearbox drive shaft. When the engine is in gear, the torsional force is imparted from the drive shaft through the countershaft to the gearbox main shaft and then through the planetary steering gear and the final drives to the driving wheels. When the engine is in operation, irrespective of whether the engine clutch is in or

Tank T-62. Sectional view: 1 — gun; 2 — AA machine gun; 3 — vision device; 4 — gun stabiliser; 5 — engine; 6 — fan; 7 — planetary steering gear; 8 — torsional suspension; 9 — road wheel; 10 — gun layer's seat; 11 — driver's seat; 12-13 — control linkage; 14 — pedals



out, the auxiliary drive connected with the engine clutch driving parts rotates cooling fan and compressor.

The tank running gear includes track assembly and suspension. The track assembly is made up of two tracks, two driving wheels, two idler wheels with track tighteners and ten road wheels. The suspension is used to cushion the tank against shocks and jolts. This device is provided with absorbers to quickly suppress vibrations which may arise in the tank hull when moving on a bad road or negotiating obstacles. This independent torsion bar suspension consists of a torsion bar, a road wheel arm with a stop and a hydraulic shock absorber. There are four hydraulic brakes connected with the front and rear road wheel arms.

The tank electrical equipment is subdivided into power sources and electric current consumers. It includes instruments and other devices fed from the electric circuit.

Tank power sources are storage batteries and a D.C. generator combined with a generator-regulator.

The tank is equipped with four 6-STEN-140M acid batteries, each of 12 V and 140 Ah.

The nuclear protection system protects the tank crew in the fighting compartment against shock wave or radioactive dust thanks to an excessive pressure built up by the blower-separator inside the tank.

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GROUND FORCES

PREPARING TANKS FOR UNDERWATER DRIVING

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 29-30

[Article by Col R. Ivanov: "Preparing Tanks for Underwater Driving"]

[Text]

Tanks fitted with underwater driving equipment can cross a river on its bed. On emerging from the water the tank crew can immediately engage the enemy without leaving the tank.

A complete set of underwater driving equipment ensures the safety of the crew, hermetic sealing of the tank, atmospheric air supply both to the crew and the engine, engine protection from water in case of a halt, pumping out of water from the tank hull and maintenance of a set direction.

The equipment consists of two parts: removable and fixed. The former is attached to the tank only before crossing a water barrier, and the latter is constantly kept on the tank.

The removable underwater driving equipment includes a snorkel, discharge valves, seals for radiator top, muzzle face, machine-gun slit, sight, aerial lead-in, air inlet shaft and air blasting system of gear reduction unit, and also rubber sealing cord of the commander's hatch and breast switches.

The fixed equipment comprises seals for the following components: engine compartment roof, air cleaner shutter with drive, gun port and TPN-1 sight head. It also includes external box sealing, drainage system of directional gyro GPK-59 and other devices, parts and assemblies indispensable for mounting and normal operation of the underwater driving equipment as a whole.

Besides, the complete set of equipment includes oxygen masks and life jackets for every crew member.

A tank which is to cross a river on its bed must have at least 1,000 km to go before overhaul. To prepare the tank for underwater driving, the crew members carry out its technical maintenance procedures, check the communication facilities including the intercom system, the di-

rectional gyro, the drainage system and the rubberised sealing, and make sure that all washers and plugs are watertight and that the turret and driver's hatches do not jam. They also check that the air pressure in the compressed air cylinders is not less than 120 kgf/cm², and if it is, refill them.

Then the tankmen proceed to check tank lateral deviation. This is done on level ground 100 m in length with the tank in first gear. The tank driver sets the steering levers in the initial position and keeps them there. To meet the standard requirements, the tank must not deviate more than 5 m from the course.

After the tank preliminary preparation is over, the crew install the removable equipment on the tank and tighten all the slits with a sealing compound. The sealing is checked by either the "soaking" or a "rarefying" method, as a rule the latter.

In the "rarefying" method, the lower part of the snorkel is put in place, the bolt removed from the opening in the front armour plate of the hull roof, and the tube of a piezometer or altimeter inserted instead. The crew remain outside the tank.

On the commander's order the tank driver enters the tank through the loader's hatch and starts the engine. Having adjusted the engine at 650 rpm, he makes sure that the rest of the crew are outside the tank. Then he leaves the vehicle through the same hatch and seals it reliably. The tank commander orders the snorkel to be closed with the cover so that stable rarefaction conditions are provided inside the vehicle in 2-3 minutes. The crew check the condition of the sealing and the commander observes the piezometer (altimeter) readings, which must be within 300 mm Hg.

Any defect detected in the sealing is immediately removed. It should be remembered, however, that for every

5 minutes the engine is running the temperature of its liquid coolant and oil will rise by nearly 10 degrees. The tank driver should mark with chalk all leaky places which will take a long time to stop and then turn the engine off. After all the faults have been removed the engine is started up again so that the work can be checked.

Of no less importance is preparation of the tank crew for forcing a water barrier on its bed. The tank commander checks the men's oxygen masks and life jackets for condition and fit. On his order the crew board the tank with their gas masks ready for use. The loader makes sure that the air cleaner shutters are closed.

The tank commander establishes radio communication with the crossing site commandant and reports his readiness to proceed.

Before entering the water the tank driver sets the handle of the fuel injection pump manual drive to the position corresponding to the set revolutions of the engine crank-shaft. Then he switches on the water drainage pump.

The tank must enter the water without jerks and move strictly in the direction of the leading mark.

Tanks must cross water obstacles in first gear with the engine doing 1,500-1,600 rpm. The tank driver must cross the river bed without halting, switching off the engine or changing gear and avoiding abrupt changes of engine speed and sharp turns.

During underwater driving the number of crankshaft revolutions must not be reduced below 1,100 rpm.

On emerging from the water the first thing to do is to open the engine compartment hatches.

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GROUND FORCES

TANK RECOVERY FROM WATER

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 p 30

[Article by Col Eng I. Dmitriyev: "Tank Recovery Out of Water"]

[Text]

Success of tanks in crossing a river on its bed depends largely on a well-organised recovery and rescue service. Underwater crossing sites are usually serviced by recovery parties organised on the spot.

Recovery parties are formed on the appropriate unit order and include two teams: rescue and recovery. The chief of engineer service draws up a training plan for the recovery party including various training themes studied either by the whole party together or by teams separately.

The first lesson is attended by the whole party. It deals with organisation of recovery and rescue service including preparing the tank for forcing a water obstacle. The tank-men are shown what places of the tank sealing are most liable to be damaged and how to attach towing ropes to a tank, how tank hatches should be opened and the engine switched out of gear.

Tank mooring technique is studied in greater detail. Attention is drawn to the procedure for towing if a tank crossing a deep ford or on the river bed is forced to stop. If recovery service is provided only on one bank, both towing ropes are fastened either to the front or the rear towing hooks of the tank and placed on the rack and top of the engine compartment. The free ends of the towing ropes are fixed to a shackle to which a rope with a buoy is connected. If there is recovery service on both banks, one towing rope is attached to the tank's front hook and the other to the rear one. The hook guards are clamped with wooden wedges. The thimbles on the free ends of the towing ropes are fitted on the metal pins on the tank racks.

Five-metre cords with red and white buoys at the end are connected to the thimbles of the front and rear towing ropes respectively. Keeping afloat, these buoys show the position of the towing ropes of a submerged tank. This allows the towing ropes to be hauled on to a boat without the help of divers.

When dealing with the first theme the trainees also refresh their memory on the main characteristics of the oxygen masks and the methods of rendering first aid to a tank crew.

The second theme is intended for study by the rescue team. It includes the following training questions: assembly of pulleys, selection of pulley blocks corresponding to the required tractive effort and engine power of the recovery tractor, use of tank retrievers as a moving anchor, methods of putting a wire rope in place in a K-61 amphibious carrier.

After the trainees have studied these questions theoretically, they go on to the third theme under the supervision of the recovery team chief (officer of technical service). They practise assembling pulley blocks and attaching them to the tanks.

The trainees are first familiarised with a diagram showing how to deliver a wire rope in an amphibious carrier to the location of the submerged tank, how to hitch it on to the vehicle and haul it out of water. Then they watch experienced specialists carrying out this job and afterwards train to do it themselves.

In the fourth theme the trainees deal with tank recovery using a pulley and two tractors, one of which serves as a moving anchor.

Practical training in tank recovery begins on land. The recovery team provided with tractors, rigging equipment and a dummy tank undergo training at an appropriate site where conventional boundaries of a water barrier are marked out. The team train in assembling pulleys to meet different tractive efforts. They also learn how to approach the boat in an amphibious carrier, deliver a hauling line and a wire rope, tie together the ends of wire ropes, reach the bank and connect the wire rope to the tractor. Then they proceed to work up various methods for recovering tanks out of water. When they have acquired sufficient practical skills the recovery team begins to operate at a crossing site checked and equipped in advance.

The rescue team includes pontoniers and divers. At the beginning they study the fifth and the sixth themes separately under the supervision of an engineer officer.

The pontoniers first study the structure and technical characteristics of various floating craft. Then they work up the technique of preparing a motor boat and a rowing boat for use, launching and steering them and approaching the submerged tank, and practise the mooring procedure. When preparing the floating craft for launching, the pontoniers pay particular attention to the condition of the hull sealing, the reliability of the water drainage equipment and of the joints between the DL-10 half-boats.

They thoroughly study the multipurpose engineer rescue set used to ensure the escape of a crew from a submerged but not flooded tank.

After the pontoniers have acquired sound technical knowledge and familiarised themselves with the safety rules, they begin to polish up their practical skill. The floating craft (motor and rowing boats and amphibious carriers) are provided with life-saving rings, hauling lines, anchors and boat hooks. The crews must wear life jackets.

A group of divers supervised by the instructor prepare their equipment for use and practise the elements of underwater work.

Having finished their separate training course the recovery and rescue teams go on to joint training.

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GROUND FORCES

TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE DESCRIBED

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 34-35

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Maj Gen P. Gredasov: "Tactical Reconnaissance"]

[Text]

THE PURPOSE of tactical reconnaissance is to disclose the composition of the enemy grouping and the location of his control posts, antitank weapons and reserves, and what is particularly important, to reveal his preparation for a nuclear attack.

At present tactical reconnaissance includes combat reconnaissance subunits and fighting arms reconnaissance subunits — artillery, engineer, radiological and chemical. Whereas in the past the activities of tactical reconnaissance were confined to a limited combat area, its modern manpower and equipment make it possible to obtain data on enemy objectives tens of kilometres away. However, owing to its purpose, it is precisely in the tactical zone that tactical reconnaissance carries out the majority of its missions.

Data on the enemy are obtained by different methods, e.g. by units' and subunits' combat actions, observation, listening, photography, interception of messages and location of radioelectronic facilities, searches, raids and ambushes.

Many of these methods have been tested by time. During the Great Patriotic War, for instance, a considerable amount of valuable reconnaissance information was obtained by observation, searches and ambushes.

Towards the end of 1942 a reconnaissance party comprising soldiers and sergeants of the 1st Infantry Battalion, 931st Infantry Regiment, Voronezh Front, carried out a successful search and captured an identification prisoner — a signal company commander of a Nazi Infantry division — who supplied fairly abundant information on the enemy manpower and equipment in the area of Kastomoya.

In 1943 at Belgorod a well-organised observation system in regiments (18-22 combat, artillery and engineer observation posts in each) allowed them to detect the moment when the enemy assumed the attack position.

We could cite numerous examples of tactical reconnaissance expertly fulfilling its mission during the last war. Front-line experience, however, has not lost its instructive value in our days.

How is reconnaissance organised in a company or battalion? First and foremost, its missions are clearly defined: exactly what data on the enemy grouping composition and nature of his activities are to be obtained. Then the company or battalion commander determines what manpower and equipment it is expedient to detail for reconnaissance and how to prepare them for executing the mission. It is most important that the commander personally assigns missions to reconnaissance parties, determines the time of sending them out and the methods of attaining the goal (observation, ambush, search, raid, etc.). Of no less significance is establishing stable and uninterrupted communication with the reconnaissance, efficiently collecting reconnaissance data, summing up and reporting it to the superior commander, as well as informing subordinates and neighbours on the enemy in good time.

Reconnaissance must be subordinated to the concept of the battle and to the missions assigned to the subunit or unit, and must correspond to the situation obtaining. Reconnaissance opens up vast possibilities for the commander to display creative initiative and resourcefulness.

Reconnaissance is likely to bear fruit only if it is con-

ducted during all kinds of troop activities, by day and by night, on any terrain and in any weather situation; it also presupposes constant observation of all the most important enemy objectives.

The initial data for a company or battalion commander to organise reconnaissance are: the combat mission assigned to the subunit, information on the enemy already available, and capabilities of manpower and equipment detailed for carrying out reconnaissance missions. Besides, he may be given reconnaissance instructions by a senior commander.

To fulfil reconnaissance missions, a subunit normally details a combat reconnaissance patrol; besides, each platoon and company and the battalion OP have well-trained observers. On the superior commander's instructions subunits may organise ambushes, searches and raids. Motorised infantry and tank battalions may also be used for reconnaissance in force.

The subunit commander bears full responsibility for organising reconnaissance, he determines its most important tasks, indicating objects and directions on which the main effort is to be concentrated. In the course of battle he exercises personal control (through the chief of staff in a battalion) over the execution of reconnaissance missions.

Exercises have provided numerous examples of competent organisation of reconnaissance. During a training battle, for instance, Captain Sizov, commander of a motorised infantry battalion, succeeded in disclosing the "enemy" fire system in the subunit's zone of advance by skilfully using observers and combat reconnaissance patrol. The battalion commander reported in good time to the regimental CO on the "enemy" artillery batteries assuming fire positions and on the opposing side laying mine fields before the forward edge and in the immediate depth of the defences.

Like many other examples, the one just cited shows once again that to organise reconnaissance competently the commander must have a profound knowledge of the nature of modern battle, of the capabilities of organic and attached reconnaissance manpower and equipment, and of the principles of their combat use.

The commander cannot count on success in battle unless he succeeds in organising efficient reconnaissance. An episode from another training battle is also instructive in this respect. The commander of an advancing motorised infantry battalion in immediate contact with the "enemy" believed that the latter had occupied the first position only with covering and security subunits. In the course of the attack it turned out, however, that during the night the "enemy" had succeeded in occupying this centre of resistance with his main forces. This miscalculation had serious consequences for the subunit.

The commander must not only assign specific missions to the reconnaissance parties, he must do so as soon as possible, for the sections, crews and platoons detailed for reconnaissance need time to get ready to execute their missions. Everything must be done to ensure success of the mission.

Experienced commanders always manage to find time

before battle for practical exercises with the reconnaissance personnel on the terrain, a mockup or map, to study, if the type of the mission should require it, the distinguishing features of the enemy objectives to be reconnoitred.

Of great importance is the ability to determine exactly the time of the beginning and end of reconnaissance. Failure to determine when and from what line reconnaissance parties are to be brought in for executing the mission may have grave consequences. Reconnaissance personnel may, for instance, intermingle with motorised infantry and tank subunits, lose contact with their commander and so on.

Maintaining stable communication with reconnaissance personnel is a matter of primary importance. Radio training conducted by many commanders during preparation for exercises has proved its worth in this respect. Reconnaissance men must be able expertly to use different brevity codes, specially drawn maps and to transmit maximum information in minimum time.

Commanders acquire the skills of organising reconnaissance during troop and command and staff exercises and drills. Practice has shown that when a complicated situation closely approximating real battle is ensured during exercises, with the trainees getting but minimum information on the "enemy," reconnaissance questions naturally come to the fore.

Exercises with combat firing impart many valuable reconnaissance skills to the entire personnel. It is most important that the layout of training targets should correspond to the organisational structure, weapons and combat equipment and tactics of enemy actions.

A positive impact on the reconnaissance training level is also made by reconnaissance competitions held in reconnaissance and motorised infantry and tank subunits, and by training all categories of servicemen on specially equipped fields.

Unit and subunit commanders show a complex approach to solving the problems of reconnaissance training. They make wide use of firing and special training exercises and of driving vehicles against the background of a specific tactical situation. In these conditions the personnel work up the power of observation and the ability to estimate distances by sight, and to make brief reports on the things observed.

The practice of joint tactical and marching drill exercises for all-arms and special platoons, companies and batteries has also proved to be of great use. It enables the commanders to acquire skills in using the information supplied by reconnaissance of fighting arms and services, which is indispensable in a modern battle.

Another efficient means of enhancing the reconnaissance training level are group exercises and briefings, and also lessons on reconnaissance subjects, examinations and seminars on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and on the probable enemy. The methods of reconnaissance are being constantly improved. The commanders make a creative use of all of its forms and of advanced experience.

The ability to conduct efficient reconnaissance in modern combat is a most important condition of troops' high field training level.

GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION DEMONSTRATION EXERCISE

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 36-37

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Col V. Zhukov: "Battalion Demonstration Exercise"]

[Text]

The purpose of demonstration tactical exercises is to extend the practical use of advanced training methods and to polish up the combat skill of units and subunits in different kinds of fighting. These exercises also help to develop a common approach to their organisation, methods of conduct and content.

Those in charge of such exercises direct their efforts to cultivating high professional, moral and combat qualities in their subordinates. For the exercise to be a success, exercise directors must be competent specialists possessing high methodical and organisational skill. This can be illustrated by a demonstration tactical exercise held in a motorised infantry battalion and dealing with the topic "Motorised Infantry Platoon in Defence."

According to the plan of combat training and political education the company commanders of this battalion were to carry out the exercise specified above with the participation of motorised infantry platoons. To cope with this mission, the battalion commander began to prepare for the demonstration exercise in advance. One of the aims he pursued was to teach the company commanders the methods of organising and conducting tactical exercises.

Besides, the forthcoming training was designed to improve platoon commanders' skill in organising defences, executing troop and fire control and also to cultivate their ability to take a resolute decision without delay and to cooperate with their neighbours.

The men were to learn how to take up positions unobserved and to operate skilfully during a defensive battle. The emphasis was on the subunits' mastering concerted defensive actions and developing high moral and psychological qualities.

In accordance with the purposes of the exercise the battalion commander specified questions to be dealt with and also the sequence and time of treating them. He did his best to bring out the practical meaning of the topic and

to outline the sequence of actions that would correspond to that of a subunit assuming the defensive when in direct contact with the enemy. The training questions suggested by the battalion CO were to embrace the whole of platoon operations at all stages of a battle. They were:

— a platoon assuming the defensive when in direct contact with the "enemy" (giving a defence order, organising observation, cooperation and fire system, engineer organisation of a strong point) — 3 training hours;

— repulsing an "enemy" attack (operations to counteract an "enemy" atomic strike or artillery preparation and attack) — 1.5 training hours;

— destroying the "enemy" bypassing the platoon strong point (specifying the platoon commander's decision, repulsing "enemy" attacks and engaging in a counterattack launched by the senior commander's forces) — 2 training hours.

Then the battalion CO began to develop a tactical situation. He proceeded from the fact that exercise conditions must be complicated, dynamic and meet modern requirements. He showed on a sketch the "enemy" position before the front of the company launching the offensive, advance of the reserves and lines of deployment for a counterattack, the line for a platoon to assume the defensive and the positions of the sides at different times according to the training questions dealt with at the exercise. He also designated the platoon strong point including the positions of sections and IFVs, the fire and barrier system, the CP-OP and right and left neighbours.

Considering that antitank fire formed the basis of the fire system the battalion CO calculated the number of fire weapons required to repulse a tank attack before the platoon front.

After that the battalion CO went to the training ground. The terrain chosen made it possible to create a quite instructive situation. The commander decided to locate the

platoon strong point on the dominating terrain feature. He also specified reference points, determined the "enemy" line of advance and the rules for using targets and dummies provided at the firing range. During the work on the terrain, the battalion chief of staff was informed of the signals on which the simulation party was to simulate the advance of "enemy" reserves, their counterattacking and bypassing the platoon strong point on the flanks.

This preliminary work at the training ground was followed by a more detailed elaboration of the demonstration exercise plan. By that time the battalion chief of staff and the deputy battalion commander for political affairs had prepared their suggestions concerning the methods of achieving high results during the exercise. Meanwhile the platoon was training.

For instance, the platoon commander was instructed to work up with his subordinates, both during individual training and at tactical and marching drill exercises, the actions of a platoon and its sections on the defensive. Besides, the battalion CO ordered him to prepare the text of a defence order and think out the sequence of operations when organising observation, cooperation and a fire system.

The company commanders who were to attend the demonstration exercise familiarised themselves with the main documents and methodical instructions.

On the training ground the battalion CO set the company commanders the mission to carry out tactical exercises with the motorised infantry platoons. He stressed the importance of this kind of training for raising the men's field training standard. He also concentrated his subordinates' attention on the measures concerning subunits' preparation for operations in complicated conditions. Explaining the procedure of drawing up the exercise plan, the battalion CO used the sketch posted on the instruction board. Meanwhile the platoon detailed to carry out the demonstration exercise was marching to the training ground arriving at the appointed time. When the platoon arrived at the demonstration site, the battalion CO explained the tactical situation to the platoon commander. It was as follows:

"Stubbornly maintaining the defensive, the 'enemy' holds advantageous ground and launches counterattacks. The 1st Mts Inf Coy develops the attack in the designated direction. The 2nd Mts Inf Pl, attacking together with the company, captures a hill where it is stopped by 'enemy' fire and mine fields. The 1st and 3rd Mts Inf Pls engage the 'enemy' on the right and left. According to recce data the 'enemy' brings in reserves to launch a counterattack."

The platoon commander was ordered to pass over to the defensive, as required by the situation. Thus began the working up of the specified training questions.

Having reached the hill the platoon began to organise a strong point. The platoon commander watched how the section leaders directed their men charged with developing defensive positions. Then he informed his subordinates on the "enemy," missions etc. to the platoon and its neighbours and proceeded to organise the fire system. Particular attention was paid to covering the approaches to

the defences, organising concentrated fire sectors and securing gaps and flanks.

When fortifying the strong point the platoon commander taught the sergeants how to position their subordinates, especially machine gunners and grenade thrower operators. He also trained IFV crews in handling their weapons. The platoon commander paid considerable attention to his subordinates' skillful use of cross and sword fire.

The company commanders watched these activities from the hill. The exercise director regularly introduced narratives to complicate the situation. At the same time he would draw the company commanders' attention to the good and bad points in the platoon's actions.

For instance, the platoon commander neglected camouflage measures when he had to change positions in organising the defence. On the order of the exercise director the simulation party exploded two smoke-puff charges which signified "enemy" fire at the hill. This helped the platoon commander to understand his mistake and to avoid it in the future.

Here is another instructive episode. Trying to complete fortification operations as quickly as possible some infantrymen, including IFV gun layers, failed to observe the ground. As at that time the "enemy" was about to launch a counterattack, the battalion CO ordered the simulation party to intensify "enemy" fire, thus making it more difficult for the platoon to organise the terrain. As a result, the platoon commander had to take the decision to neutralise "enemy" fire weapons. He also ordered the section leaders to improve ground observation so as to be able to destroy any "enemy" targets that might appear.

When the fire system was ready, the battalion CO reminded the company commanders of the theoretical principles concerning the organisation of defences and invited them to inspect the strong point. They checked the location and camouflage of firing positions and the men's knowledge of their duties. It turned out that some trainees occupied disadvantageous positions. For instance, one machine gunner took up a position which limited his firing range to 500 m. At that moment the section leader received the narrative to destroy an "enemy" fire emplacement at a distance considerably exceeding 500 m. The machine gunner changed his position and was then able to use his weapon more effectively.

The situation created during the demonstration exercise was instructive and all the questions specified were treated in a strict order. Company commanders had an opportunity to watch the platoon commander's actions when he controlled his subunit repulsing "enemy" attacks, foiling "enemy" attempts to bypass the strong point on the flank and destroying a penetrated "enemy" group.

The demonstration exercise ended with a critique. The battalion CO gave a detailed analysis of the platoon actions in dealing with all training questions. He noted those who had distinguished themselves, pointed to the mistakes and showed on the spot how to avoid them. The company commanders present at the critique were shown graphically how to assess infantrymen's actions during a tactical exercise on the theme: "Motorised Infantry Platoon in Defence."

GROUND FORCES

INDEPENDENT TANK AND INFANTRY OPERATIONS

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 26-28

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Maj Gen L. Korzun, Cand. Sci. (Military); "Independent Operations"]

[Text]

In independent operations of tank and motorised infantry units and subunits we usually understand actions carried out away from the main forces, when they fulfil assigned missions without substantial support in manpower and equipment from the senior commander and neighbours. Although in carrying out the most complicated missions they can receive a certain support (air or rocket forces blows or air landings), this support is not determinant.

Raid operations of tank and motorised infantry units and subunits penetrating into the enemy rear for the purpose of capturing or destroying nuclear weapons, airfields, control posts, installations, bridges and crossings, disorganising logistics, etc. are also included among independent operations.

Already before the war serious attention was paid to the problem of independent operations of units and subunits of the Soviet Army. The role of such operations was correctly defined in a theory of deep combat or operation, elaborated as early as the 1930s. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Tukhachevsky persistently recommended to train soldiers and small subunits to carry out energetic, courageous and independent actions. This thought was repeatedly mentioned in other theoretical works and was put into practice.

During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) independent operations were most characteristic of advance detachments and advance guards. This was due, first and foremost, to the content of the combat missions carried out by them and the specifics of the situation.

When the enemy was being pursued, advance detachments were sent to capture and hold until the arrival of the main force important lines and objectives, large road junctions, mountain passes and gaps and bridgeheads. Frequently they acted at a considerable distance from the main forces. Advance guards sent by formations and units of the ground forces carried out pursuit in route formation and accordingly acted at a smaller distance from the main forces. They were assigned the mission to prevent surprise enemy attacks against the main force and penetration by his reconnaissance into a zone of movement of forces and to create favourable conditions for their deployment and commitment to action. They were also to destroy the enemy in the security zone or on the approaches to natural obstacles, etc.

The methods of units' and subunits' actions depending on the character of the missions carried out and situations differed fundamentally. But some features were common and obligatory for all methods. Let us dwell briefly on them.

Success of independent operations depended to a great extent on the effectiveness of reconnaissance, completeness and reliability of the obtained information on the enemy and terrain. But for units and particularly subunits operating independently the obtaining of such information is seriously hampered because of scarceness of their own reconnaissance possibilities and the delay in the arrival of data from a higher headquarters. The experience of the war showed that it was necessary for the units and subunits operating independently to carry out their own reconnaissance.

During the Berlin operation the 162nd Tank Brigade in the Cottbus area started pursuit of the withdrawing enemy. Its mission was not an easy one—to forestall the withdrawing grouping of the main forces and bar its withdrawal route. The brigade commander decided to send an advance detachment consisting of a tank battalion under Major Antonov. At that time the battalion had 17 tanks. It was reinforced with 6 SAU-152 and a company of submachine gunners. Realising the great significance of the reconnaissance, Major Antonov despite his scant forces, sent a separate reconnaissance patrol (comprising two tanks, a section of submachine gunners and a section of combat engineers), a forward and a rear security patrol. He prepared thoroughly for the operation and made his personnel do so too. Before the beginning of the movement he defined on the map the probable lines of meeting with the enemy, the way to deploy and the actions on these lines. Each crew and every submachine gunner knew exactly their mission. All knew the method of target designation and signals.

Destroying and dislodging covering subunits on its way the battalion rushed forward and cut the Cottbus-Lubencu motor road.

At that time the separate reconnaissance patrol reported that up to a regiment of nazi infantry with tanks and artillery was withdrawing along the highway. The forces were obviously unequal. But the advance detachment had serious advantages. First, the enemy did not suspect that there were Soviet tanks in his rear. Second, the advance detachment was superior in the number and combat capabilities of the tanks. Major Antonov decided to exploit these advantages. By a surprise blow the battalion cut the column of the enemy regiment in two before it could deploy. One part was routed, the other taken prisoner.

Continuing to advance along the forest road the separate reconnaissance patrol established that Hitlerite infantry battalion reinforced with two artillery batteries was holding defences in an inhabited locality. The terrain made it impossible to bypass this inhabited locality. The reconnaissance patrol reported this in good time. After ten minutes of intense fire the battalion attacked from different directions, captured the village and cleared the way for the brigade's main forces to pursue the enemy.

Thus, reconnaissance and skilful choice of method played their role and provided the possibility for the advance detachment to carry out the mission successfully.

However, the experience of the Great Patriotic War also showed that information on the enemy and terrain received from reconnaissance bodies sent by the senior commander in this direction, from the air and other types of reconnaissance was also very important for the troops acting independently. Mutual supplementing and generalisation of one's own and the superior commander's reconnaissance data are extremely necessary for success in battle of any subunits or units, particularly those acting independently.

A feature of fighting in the depth of the enemy defences is wide use of manoeuvre. Therefore it is important for units and subunits operating independently to make skilful use of all its forms. Here a manoeuvre by such subunits as a company or a battalion can be very effective for it frequently predetermines success of formations and even operational large units. The following example proves this.

On a sector of the Soviet-German front late in March 1945 the Hitlerites were withdrawing large forces to the west. The tank battalion commanded by Captain Kosterin was to forestall one of the withdrawing groupings and destroy it. The battalion CO organised pursuit along parallel routes. Although the terrain hampered movement, the tankmen nevertheless managed to forestall the enemy and laid an ambush near a cross-road. Unexpected fire from all types of weapons stunned the Nazis, paralysed their will to resist, and a courageous and daring tank attack completed the defeat of the enemy. It became possible to pursue the enemy in the operational depth without stopping.

In operations of the Great Patriotic War while pursuing the enemy our forces used various forms of manoeuvre, the most frequent being turning and enveloping movements. These forms of manoeuvre preserve all their significance in contemporary conditions. It is true that the weapons and the character of combat actions have changed and this affects manoeuvre. The increased technological equipment of tank and motorised infantry units and subunits, the constant perfection of weaponry, materiel and control means make it possible today to carry out deeper turning and enveloping movements and at a higher speed than during the Great Patriotic War. If earlier a turning movement was carried out, as a rule, to envelop an enemy grouping, in modern conditions it may be necessary to bypass areas with a high radiation level.

Improved air transport makes it possible for forces to carry out turning movement by air, i.e. to airlift subunits to the required area on helicopters or airplanes.

Combat activity plays an important role in independent actions of units and subunits. It presupposes first of all, commanders' skill to choose the most appropriate method of action for the given conditions, resoluteness and courage and, when necessary, also a risk. It is clear that a risk must not be rash but based on the tactical competence of the commander, his experience and knowledge. Courage, resolve, daring and risk are obligatory components of independent actions of units and subunits. The fighting men of the Soviet Army are educated in the spirit of courage and bravery, in the ability and habit of personal responsibility for the most courageous and risky decisions.

The Great Patriotic War gave quite a few examples of daring operations by small subunits which resulted in considerable success. Thus in April 1945, a reconnaissance subunit under Captain Frolov consisting of only two APCs and nine motorcycles captured by a surprise attack a large nazi aerodrome and 65 planes. It is quite clear that these daring and even risky actions were based, above all, on the commanders' sober calculation and reasonable initiative, their creative approach to their missions.

These very qualities acquire particular value when the subunits have to fight the numerically superior or equal enemy forces. Such situations arise most often when units and subunits act away from the main force. For example, an advance detachment under Major Moroz found itself in a very complicated situation. In order to cut the railway and highway it was necessary to capture a large inhabited locality where there were many tank ambushes. A frontal attack could have led to heavy losses and promised no success. Then Major Moroz decided to make a feint attack and withdrawal in order to entice the enemy tanks from the ambush into the open. The plan of the advance detachment's commander succeeded. Having repulsed an attack by several Soviet tanks and "forced" them to withdraw, the nazi tanks left their ambush and began the pursuit. Not having detected the main force of the advance detachment, the enemy tanks approached within direct fire range and were destroyed by surprise fire. Exploiting the enemy's confusion, the advance detachment rushed into the inhabited locality, captured it and cut the railway and highway.

Analysis of even a limited number of examples from the experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that independent operations by tank and motorised infantry units or subunits play an important role both tactically and operationally.

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GROUND FORCES

TRAINING FOR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 36-37

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Col Yu Chernyshov: "A Battalion-Strong Advanced Detachment in Defence"]

[Text]

When assuming the defensive out of contact with the enemy, the defenders may set up a security zone consisting of two or three positions. In such cases advanced detachments are detailed from the second echelons. They normally consist of motorised infantry or tank battalions in the direction of the main effort, and of companies reinforced with tanks, ATGMs, artillery and sapper subunits with obstacle dressing facilities in secondary directions.

The strength and number of advanced detachments is determined proceeding from the importance of the direction defended, the nature of the terrain, and the width and depth of the security zone.

A battalion-strong advanced detachment organises a defence area on each position; this area may be considerably larger than the defence area of a battalion holding defences under usual conditions. Therefore, an advanced detachment assumes a one-echelon battle formation with an attached all-arms reserve consisting of a reinforced motorised infantry platoon. The reserve is intended to cope with unexpectedly arising tasks, e.g. to repel enemy strikes at the advanced detachment's flank or rear, and also to destroy small reconnaissance and sabotage groups in the depth of the defences.

If the first-echelon subunits withdraw to an alternate position, the reserve can defend a strong point in the most important direction, thereby making it possible for the battalion's main force to break off action and occupy a new defence area.

Motorised infantry companies and platoons organise strong points in the main directions, where enemy motorised infantry and tank attack is anticipated. It is desirable that the strong point's flanks are covered by sectors of terrain of difficult access to enemy tanks, e.g. swamps, ravines or the like. The sizes of platoon and company strong points are similar to those in usual conditions. Therefore, the defence area of a battalion acting as an advanced detachment is extended by widening the gaps between strong points, and not the strong points themselves. Company strong points being located at considerable distances from each other, a motorised infantry company may be reinforced with an artillery battery, antitank weapons (up to a battery), sappers (up to a section), and a platoon with antitank weapons.

Tanks are effective against tanks and are highly manoeuvrable, which is particularly important during the advanced detachment's withdrawal from one position to another. Besides, tanks may be used advantageously in ambushes in likely directions of enemy advance, at places offering facilities for observing enemy tanks and APCs and firing at them. Such places are usually forest and grove clearings, reverse slopes of hills, bushes, outskirts of inhabited localities, etc.

A certain number of tanks are subordinated directly to the commander of the advanced detachment, the remainder being attached to a motorised infantry company holding defences in the main direction.

The advanced detachment's combat mission indicates: zone of operations, defence areas on

each position, areas to be prepared by the senior commander's forces, procedure for equipping them and fighting to hold them, and also control, target designation and cooperation signals.

The commander takes the decision to give battle according to the map, and subsequently specifies it on the terrain. In the decision he defines the defence area on each position and the action to be taken to hold it or to disengage and withdraw to alternate positions.

Reconnaissance for the purpose of specifying the decision is carried out on APCs or helicopters, and under the command of the deputy commander of the subunit detailing the detachment. The reconnaissance starts on the first position. Alternate positions are generally reconnoitred after the advanced detachment's subunits have occupied the first position in order to gain time for organising defences on it.

The reconnaissance specifies tank-threatened directions, sectors of the terrain on which stability of the defence is dependent, the direction of the main effort, layout of the forward edge of each position, location of strong points, tank ambushes and their missions, battle formation of the advanced detachment on each position, routes and sequence of withdrawal into the depth in holding the defensive positions, procedure and nature of engineer support, location of the battalion's command posts during fighting to hold each position, and logistic and medical support.

The advanced detachment engages the enemy when the latter reaches the far approaches to the first position.

Attempts by enemy reconnaissance to disclose the pattern of the defence and of his advanced subunits to capture jumping-off grounds on the first position or to break through this position are repulsed only by part of the advanced detachment's manpower and equipment so as not to betray its fire system.

When the enemy main force begins deploying to attack the first position, the fire of the artillery located on covered fire positions is reinforced by tank and ATGM fire. When the enemy launches the attack, all fire weapons of the advanced detachment engage him to make him deploy his main force, disclose his grouping and intention, and to frustrate any attempt to break through the first position of the security zone from march column. Separate tanks and motorised infantry groups which have penetrated into the depth of the defences are destroyed by fire of antitank weapons and if necessary of the advanced detachment's reserve.

The advanced detachment holds the first position either for a definite period of time specified by the senior commander or until it receives the signal to withdraw to an alternate position.

The procedure for disengagement and assuming defence on the next position depends on the situation. In limited visibility the detachment's main force disengages suddenly under cover of tanks and APCs.

Disengagement from the advancing enemy in the daytime calls for thorough cooperation between the senior commander's artillery and aviation and the advanced detachment. Withdrawal from action is effected after dealing a powerful fire blow at the enemy, sometimes even after a short counterattack and sometimes secretly, without a fire blow. This last method is most rational when the enemy attack has been repelled and he is preparing for another.

The advanced detachment withdraws from battle according to a previously arranged plan. When taking the decision to disengage and assume the defensive on an alternate position, the commander of the advanced detachment foresees the priority of disengagement, the sequence and routes of withdrawal to an alternate position, subunits' missions when withdrawing and assuming the defence on an alternate position, covering manpower and equipment and succession of their actions, the system of engineer obstacles, artillery missions, location of the detachment's CP-OP and the procedure for shifting it.

The advanced detachment's withdrawal is generally effected in the following sequence. The first to withdraw undetected are logistic and certain artillery (mortar) subunits followed by motorised infantry subunits. They withdraw behind the nearest shelters to form up into platoon columns or mount APCs in order to move quickly to an alternate position. The direction of withdrawal is chosen so as to ensure neutralisation of the enemy by flank fire of the first-position supporting sub-units. The detachment is also covered by artillery fire, smoke screens and engineer obstacles.

Covering subunits (a tank platoon or APC-mounted platoon from each company) hold the occupied lines until the predetermined time or until receiving the command to withdraw. The withdrawal is effected in leaps from one line advantageous for battle to another, the extent of the leaps depending on the terrain.

While the main forces are withdrawing and assuming defence on an alternate position, an all-arms reserve is committed to action on the threat-

tened direction, with the task mainly of preventing deep enemy flanking movements. In certain conditions it may assume in advance the defence of a strong point on the position to which the detachment shifts its main effort, subsequently fighting in the first echelon.

As a rule, the commander of the advanced detachment withdraws from the first position with the last subunit holding the defences in the direction of the main effort. In so doing he directs the battle from the CP-OP, normally located in or near the defence area of the all-arms reserve.

The advanced detachment fight with maximum effort to hold each position. Skilfully manoeuvring with fire and subunits and making use of obstacles, demolitions, flooding and smoke screens, the advanced detachments exhaust the enemy, forcing his tanks and motorised infantry to deploy and advance in disadvantageous directions. Such actions allow the advanced detachment to gain time and create favourable conditions for combat operations of the main defence force.

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GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS IN COUNTERATTACK METHODS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 38-39

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Col A. Akimov: "Counterattacks in the Defensive"]

[Text]

A battalion destroys the enemy penetrating defences with fire from all weapons of subunits, artillery and mortars, and under favourable conditions counterattacks.

A battalion in the 1st echelon usually counterattacks with the second echelon (reserve) of a regiment or in cooperation with neighbouring subunits.

It counterattacks independently when small enemy forces have penetrated the defences and also at night and in conditions of limited visibility.

The second echelon (reserve) and subunits of the first echelon, in the direction of the counterattack and adjoining it are drawn into the counterattack. When possible, subunits are taken from the sectors of the front not attacked by the enemy. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles constitute the main striking force.

It is advisable to carry out a counterattack at the moment when the advancing tanks and infantry have sustained heavy losses and are stopped and the reserves moving up are held up by artillery and mortar fire and air strikes.

Secrecy in preparing a counterattack is particularly important for success. An unexpected and rapid blow at the enemy flanks and rear even with small forces frequently forces him to draw off a considerable part of the subunits from the main direction.

The composition of the counterattacking subunits of a battalion being small, superiority over the enemy can be achieved, first of all, by concentrating fire. For this purpose most of the artillery, mortars and other fire weapons of the battalion or regiment are committed. Besides, the fire weapons of the motorised infantry subunits adjoining the flanks of the counterattackers, are used. The enemy reserves approaching the sector of penetration, the artillery and control points are usually destroyed by air attacks and the artillery of the senior commander.

If the enemy has penetrated at a junction point the subunits destroy him by fire from all weapons, striving not to allow him to advance towards the flanks and in depth, and under advantageous conditions to destroy him by counterattacks in cooperation with the neighbour.

Very effective are counterattacks at night and in conditions of limited visibility. The troops in this case are thoroughly trained for orientation on the terrain and for using illumination means and night vision devices. To ensure that the second echelon (reserve) advances to the deployment line in an orderly manner, the route of advance to it and the line itself and directions of the counterattacks are designated in advance by markers and landmarks observable in the dark. When the second echelon (reserve) reaches the deployment line the enemy and terrain are illuminated.

In his decision to counterattack the battalion CO points out: the deployment line of the second echelon (reserve), the direction and time of the beginning of the counterattack, missions for second echelon and motorised infantry subunits participating in it and supporting it, the route of advance of the second echelon (reserve) to the deployment line for the counterattack, the manner of carrying out the artillery attack and supporting the counterattack, how cooperation is to be achieved between subunits; the place of the battalion's command and observation post. He reports his decision to the regimental commander.

After receiving the order for a counterattack the company commander of the second echelon (reserve) also takes a decision, assigns combat missions to the subordinate subunits and coordinates their actions. All this is done in a very short time (usually during the advance to the deployment line).

The advance is carried out secretly on infantry fighting vehicles (APCs) or on foot under cover of tank, ATGM, artillery and mortar fire.

Tanks from strong points adjoining the direction of the counterattack are usually attached to the second echelon (reserve). If it is impossible to withdraw some of them, they are assigned the mission to destroy by fire the enemy who have penetrated.

First echelon subunits not participating in the counterattack, hold the occupied positions, immobilise the enemy,

not allowing him to shift fire on to the counterattacking subunits. Under favourable conditions they exploit the results of the counterattack and pass over to the offensive for the purpose of improving their own positions.

The battalion's second echelon (reserve) after a ten-fifteen-minute artillery barrage with fire support from ATGMs, tanks and artillery resolutely attacks the enemy who has penetrated the defences and destroys him.

Then the battalion's subunits restore the defences and prepare to repulse repeated enemy attacks. As soon as the defences are restored the second echelon (reserve) can be withdrawn to its area or left in the first echelon. In the latter case it is replaced by subunits either not attacked by the enemy, or before whose front his attacks failed.

Let us follow the actions of a motorised infantry battalion at a tactical exercise independently attacking the "enemy" who have penetrated the defences.

The 1st Mts Inf Bn, under Major Borisov, reinforced with a tank company and supported by an artillery battalion, pursuing the "enemy" in the direction Pokrovka-Selivanovo (see Sketch), met organised resistance on the eastern slopes of hills 88.1 and 71.2. The attempts of the battalion's subunits to break through an intermediate line failed. A repeated attack was also unsuccessful. The "enemy" had apparently assumed the defensive in good time, as was proved by the entrenched tanks, ATGMs and APCs in the strong points. Besides, it became known that the "enemy" was bringing up reserves to pass over to the offensive.


On the order of the regimental commander the battalion assumed the defensive on the line: stones-separate houses with the mission not to allow the "enemy" to break through along the Selivanovo-Pokrovka highway.

Having received the combat order for defence, the battalion CO took a decision to consolidate on the eastern bank of Chisty Stream, assuming two-echelon battle formation. Then he assigned combat missions to the subordinate subunits and carried out on-the-spot reconnaissance. During on-the-spot reconnaissance alongside with other questions Major Borisov specified the deployment lines, routes of advance and probable directions of the counterattack. The battalion CO defined two directions: No. 1 — north-western slopes of Hill 122.1-spring and No. 2 — barrow +2-shed. It was not excluded that the "enemy" might pass over to the offensive during the night. Therefore necessary measures were also foreseen.

At night the battalion CO got a report from the commander of an independent reconnaissance patrol located in Maleya Wood, that the "enemy" was concentrating motorised infantry and tanks on the western slopes of hills 88.1 and 71.2.

Having received this information Major Borisov ordered the organisation of the terrain with engineer works to be speeded up, vigilance to be increased and active reconnaissance to be carried out.

In the morning the "enemy" began an artillery barrage which lasted for 30 minutes. Following this tanks and motorised infantry launched an attack. Fire weapons of the battalion and artillery supporting them carried out intensive



sive fire at the attacking "enemy." An attack before the 1st Mts Inf Coy and along the highway was beaten off. However, on the right flank of the 2nd Mts Inf Coy the "enemy" managed to penetrate the battalion defences with one and a half infantry platoons and six tanks. The threat of the "enemy" reaching the highway arose. The battalion CO decided to mount a counterattack before the "enemy" reserves arrived. Borisov knew about the "enemy" reserves from the report of the reconnaissance patrol. He immediately reported his decision to the regimental commander and asked him to hold up the advancing "enemy" reserves and to silence his artillery in the Pavlovka area. Borisov himself concentrated a considerable part of his fire weapons on the destruction of the "enemy" who had penetrated. Besides, he sent two tanks to Kruglaya Wood to fire from ambush.

Having received permission to carry out a counterattack the battalion CO assigned the following combat missions: the 3rd Mts Inf Coy with the 1st Tk Coy (less a platoon) from the line: bushes-separate house by a counterattack in the direction: north-western slopes of Hill 122.1-stream to destroy the "enemy" who had penetrated and restore the defences; the artillery battalion and mortar battery to destroy the mortar battery on the western slopes of Hill 71.2 and support the battalion's counterattack with a fifteen-minute barrage.

When everything was ready, the 3rd Mts Inf Coy with the 1st Tk Coy advanced to the deployment line and after an artillery attack supported by fire from tanks, ATGMs and infantry fighting vehicles, counterattacked the "enemy" who had penetrated on the flank. The 2nd Mts Inf Coy mounted a counterattack directly after the second echelon.

At the start of the counterattack three "enemy" tanks which had penetrated were approaching Kruglaya Wood but were destroyed. The attacking "enemy" infantry and tanks suffered heavy losses and were stopped. The regimental artillery managed to prevent the movement of "enemy" reserves and prevented him from exploiting the success.

A counterattack by the second echelon of the battalion was delivered at the flank of the "enemy" who had penetrated. The company on whose sector the "enemy" had penetrated the defences took an active part in his destruction. All this favoured a quick restoration of the defence.

The experience of the exercise shows that the preparation and carrying out of a counterattack is a complicated and responsible process. Only reliable neutralisation by fire of the "enemy" who has penetrated, correct choice of the moment and direction of a counterattack, good organisation and support of the counterattacking subunits ensure success.

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

TACTICAL BRIEFING METHODS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 40-41

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Lt Col Yu. Chinkov: "Tactical Briefing"]

[Text]

Tactical briefing is a form of unit or subunit officer training. The Air Defence Forces have accumulated great experience in conducting such briefings, during which officials, e.g. officers of AA missile subunits learn to take well-grounded decisions in a limited time with limited, and sometimes contradictory data at their disposal, to implement these decisions purposefully and persistently, and to show resolution, initiative and military cunning. That is why tactical briefings are widely used to work up practical questions envisaged by the plan of combat training and political education.

During the short time allotted for a briefing one or two training questions, generally bearing on fire control in battle, are tackled. Tactical briefing is generally held after studying one complicated training subject or several other subjects, for the purpose of consolidating knowledge and acquiring practical skills. All trainees usually discharge the functions of one official.

Tactical briefings are conducted as individual combat training lessons or as part of group exercises; they take place in a classroom or at the command post, i.e. directly at officers' workplaces.

The instructive value of a tactical briefing largely depends on its provision with training aids and facilities, which includes equipment of workplaces, selection of methodical and reference literature and maps of required scales. To demonstrate the initial situation or episodes of a "battle" and issue narratives, wide use is made of simulation and projecting equipment or other technical training aids. If the briefing takes place at a subunit command post, the commander is in a position to evaluate the officers' proficiency in battle control in a specific situation.

The themes of tactical briefings correspond to the missions facing a subunit or unit. Here are just a few of them: "Assessment of the Air Enemy in Organising and During Battle," "Methods of Calculating Target Designation and Distribution Lines in Controlling Subunits' Fire," "Methods of Searching for and Destroying High-Speed Manoeuvring Targets," "Determining the Most Likely Routes of Air Attack," etc.

Each tactical briefing is preceded by preparatory work consisting in drawing up the assignment, determining the concept, working out instructions in method for the instructor to conduct and evaluate the briefing, and in establishing a plan of the briefing. The assignment is worked out by unit headquarters and sent to subunits to enable the officers to get ready for the briefing in good time. It consists of several sections (general and specific situation, reference data, etc.) containing all the information essential for working out the concept and the plan of the briefing. The contents of a specific assignment for each category of officers are normally made known at the beginning of the briefing.

The general situation section sets forth the data on the air "enemy" and friendly forces at a definite exercise time, and measures to be taken to simulate the tactical background. The specific situation section contains data on the subunit at a given exercise time, e.g. composition and location of and combat missions for cooperating neighbours, and also questions and tasks for the subunit commander.

Reference data contain information on the subunit's fighting strength, composition of manpower and equipment, crews' training level and teamwork, weather conditions and the like.

The main stages in preparing a tactical briefing are working out the concept and the plan of the briefing.

The concept of the briefing corresponds to its theme and takes account of the potentialities of the potential air enemy and friendly subunits. The concept consists of a sketch and a text. The former is worked out on the map in the form of two decisions (the "enemy's" and the friendly subunit commander's), coordinated in time.

The "enemy's" decision includes the general concept of his attack, direction and time of blow, likely tactical methods of actions, echelonnement and distribution of manpower and equipment on the objective and among battle formations of the subunit and neighbours, and other tactical questions.

The friendly subunit commander's decision is elaborated on the basis of the "enemy's" concept of combat operations in the scope necessary to work up thoroughly all training questions. This decision normally contains the general concept of repelling the air enemy in cooperation with the neighbours in different situations, execution of a manoeuvre in the course of fighting, how to destroy targets in the zone of cooperation with fighter aircraft, etc.

The plan of the briefing drawn up in a working notebook in the form of a table presents the theme, training purpose, time, place and training aids and facilities, instructions in method and other reference materials to be used. The plan formulates the basic questions to be tackled at the briefing and the time allotted for them.

To reduce the time required to prepare for individual questions of the training theme, the concept and the plan may be drawn up directly on the map. In this case the textual part of the theme may be omitted altogether.

The method directions gave recommendations for the instructor as regards organisation of the tactical briefing, how to conduct it and evaluation of the briefing as a whole and of individual officers' skills.

Several days prior to the briefing the instructor organises group and individual consultations for the officers of the training group. He draws the officers' attention to the necessity of acquiring deep knowledge of and the ability meticulously to execute the basic instructions on organising and performing combat alert duty and combat training as a whole.

During the briefing the instructor sees to it that each officer solves all tasks independently and fulfils the assignment in the volume prescribed by the plan of the briefing. Answers to questions and narratives are presented in writing or orally, in the form of practical actions, decisions, reports, and so on. At the end of the briefing the instructor analyses the performance of each trainee acting in a specific post, and gives marks.

In evaluating the actions of an officer fulfilling the functions of the commander, there must be an assessment of his ability constantly to study and evaluate the air situation, his actions in ensuring combat readiness of the sub-unit, the precision and timeliness of assigning missions to the chief of staff and other crew members and to subordinated subunits during the fighting, efficiency of communication, i.e. timeliness of mutual information.

Analyzing the briefing is an important component of combat training, for it enables the commander to focus his subordinates' attention on the goal set and the results achieved, to assess each officer's tactical thinking, initiative and creative approach. In making a profound and competent analysis of the subordinates' decisions, the instructor gives practical recommendations and strives to develop a common viewpoint as regards the use of weapons entrusted to them.

A well-organised and methodically correct tactical briefing develops in the personnel high combat, moral, political and psychological qualities, and this in turn enhances missilemen's proficiency and AA missile units' and subunits' readiness to fulfil competently any combat mission at any time.

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NAVAL FORCES

REGULATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 38-40

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Drozdov: "Naval Regulations"]

[Text]

THE NAVAL REGULATIONS are justly referred to as the code of laws governing naval service; they reflect the experience of many generations of sailors scrupulously accumulated and tested in numerous battles and campaigns.

The first Naval Regulations of the Soviet Navy appeared in 1925. They were superseded by the Naval Regulations of 1939. By that time the Navy had been considerably modernised and the cultural and technical level of its personnel considerably enhanced. The new Regulations played an important part in the solution of the tasks which faced ships' crews in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). However, the experience of that period testified to the necessity to improve operational and tactical training and to link it more closely with political education. These and other questions were developed in the 1943 Naval Regulations.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and the tremendous changes which have taken place in the Navy due to scientific and technical progress were more fully reflected in the 1959 Naval Regulations, which were in force for nearly two decades. During that period the Navy was provided with modern ships and weaponry, its tactics and organisational structure constantly developed and experience of long cruises was accumulated and improved. All these factors called for new alterations in the Regulations.

The existing 1978 Naval Regulations of the Soviet Navy were drawn up in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR adopted in 1977; they take full account of the qualitative changes which have occurred in the Navy recently. The entire service and leisure of ships' and other water craft's personnel is organised according to these Regulations, their requirements being obligatory for every Navy man.

The Regulations open with the texts of the National Anthem of the USSR and the Oath of Allegiance. They are followed by the general principles that no foreign government has the right to interfere with the life of a Soviet naval ship, that the prime duty of commanding officers and the entire personnel, in their relations with foreign naval ships and authorities, is to uphold the dignity and interests of the USSR in all circumstances.

The Regulations contain the following sections: "Organisation and Preparation of a Ship," "Daily Service on a Ship," "Flags, Doing Military Honours, Ceremonies," and "Watch Service." The sections are subdivided into 21 chapters including 890 articles, to some of which are appended supplements at the end of the Regulations.

The Naval Regulations reflect practically all aspects of navy men's activity, including shipboard routine, combat training and leisure, maintenance of ships, damage control, repair and watch service, and sets forth the officers' duties. The Regulations provide answers to all questions pertaining to naval service.

In the Soviet Navy the ship is headed by its commander aided by the executive officer (who is his immediate assistant) and the deputy commander for political affairs and other assistants provided for by the ship's establishment.

For more efficient use of weapons and combat equipment, action stations and services are organised. Until recently Soviet naval ships had five action stations, i.e. navigator's, gunnery, torpedo, signal and engineering action stations. However, the high saturation of surface ships and submarines with weapons and combat equipment has necessitated a more perfect system which found its expression in the 1978 Naval Regulations, namely in the chapter "Fundamentals of a Ship's System," which con-

lains provision for two more action stations: aviation and control action stations.

For battle, the ship's complement are distributed among the command posts and action stations, each of which has a name, designation and serial number. A number of ships have now been provided with a main control room for collecting, processing and analysing data on the situation.

To distribute the complement among the command posts and action stations, to enable them to use weapons and combat equipment efficiently and to perform other regular operations, so-called station bills are drawn up.

The Naval Regulations emphasise that combat training on ships must be carried out in conditions closely approximating real battle and meet the requirements of a modern naval action. The Regulations set forth the principal forms of combat training for all categories of naval personnel. They include theoretical and practical lessons and exercises, individual studies, group exercises and tactical briefings being additionally organised for officers. All these matters are elucidated in the chapter "Combat Training".

The Regulations stress the necessity for further improving the forms and methods of Party-political work, which is regarded as one of the main conditions for ensuring the ship's combat readiness and fighting efficiency. The chapter "Political Work on a Ship" obliges commanders and political workers to maintain constant contact with the complement, to develop in the servicemen high moral, political, combat and psychological qualities, love for the sea and the striving to master to perfection the weapons and combat equipment entrusted to them. The Regulations oblige the commander to direct the activities of political workers to successful execution of the mission assigned to the ship's complement.

The Naval Regulations have brought the main duties of all servicemen into accord with the system laid down in the Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces. The commanding officer's duties have been considerably extended taking into account the specifics of life on board ship. There has been added a description of actions to be taken in such situations as preparation for a cruise, during a cruise, in case of accidents, during the building and repair of the ship and when taking or handing it over. They take into account the many years of experience in preparing ships for cruises and handling weapons and combat equipment under different conditions.

The chapter "Shipboard Routine" provides the basis for

the most rational and uniform time distribution on ships depending on the situation, to ensure success in combat training and political education and in other aspects of the complement's activity. The way of giving individual signals has been defined more clearly. The Regulations lay down, for example, that no one but the ship's commander has the right to give the order to the duty (watch) officer to get the ship ready for battle or a cruise, to give the "General Quarters" signal or to form up the entire complement at a time not envisaged by the daily plan or schedule. In the CO's absence this right is exercised by the person acting for him.

The chapter "Maintenance of a Ship" expounds the complement's duties according to their specialities, the procedure for reviews and inspections, various kinds of work to be done on a ship, cleaning and maintenance of piers, moorage walls and water areas. The chapter also contains the requirements for environmental protection. It reads in part: "Naval personnel must be constantly educated in the spirit of personal responsibility for purity of the sea and must master persistently the methods and techniques of fighting sea water pollution."

The Regulations underscore that the entire complement must see to it that nobody violates the measures ensuring the ship's survivability, i.e. its ability to withstand damage sustained either in combat or in an accident. The chapter "Damage Control on a Ship" generalises the experience of fire and water fighting on ships and other water craft accumulated by navies and merchant marines throughout the world, and gives a detailed description of the duties of and actions to be taken by officers in emergency situations. The Regulations set forth the measures for preventing accidents when divers work in close proximity of the ship and other personnel switch on powerful readers, lift or lower extension devices, containers, etc.

The chapter "Making the Colours" stresses that the man-of-war ensign hoisted on a ship of the Soviet Navy is the ship's combat colour symbolising its readiness to protect the USSR's state interests on sea and ocean communications. All the ship's complement must protect the USSR's national flag and man-of-war ensign selflessly and courageously and prevent them from falling into enemy hands.

As provided by the Regulations, ships of the Soviet Navy are to do military honours at places of glorious victories and heroic wrecks of Russian and Soviet naval ships. The Regulations define the procedure and organisation of this ceremony.

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NAVAL FORCES

EMERGENCY EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 29-30

[Article, under the heading "Combat Training", by Capt 1st Rank Eng M. Mikhailov (Mikhaylov): "Ship's Exercises"]

[Text]

General emergency exercises on a ship are subdivided into training, test, control and demonstration exercises.

Training exercises are generally held when working up current training tasks. During such exercises the personnel of departments, action station commanders in particular, strive to achieve precision of actions and acquire skill in establishing and maintaining cooperation between crews and action stations. Besides, individual elements of the ship's tactical missions are worked up at these exercises. Thus, at the gunnery department exercises on the theme "Repelling an Enemy Air Attack" the personnel simultaneously work up the components of organising the ship's air defence at sea, crew members' sequence of actions in detecting an air enemy and in getting ready for firing and target destruction.

After execution of each particular task the department head or chief of service conducts a test exercise for the department's personnel to check the level of knowledge and

skills acquired and determine the degree of combat readiness. To ensure objective and comprehensive testing and evaluation of the men's proficiency the ship's CO enlists the services of umpires.

The same purpose is served by control exercises, with the only difference that they are conducted by the ship's CO or senior commanders.

General demonstration exercises are held to teach officers personnel training methods and familiarise them with the procedure of conducting exercises. They are prepared most thoroughly on one of the ships of the formation with all officers present.

Here is how a general demonstration exercise proceeded on a small antisubmarine ship. It began on the emergency alarm signal. The engineering department's personnel promptly took their action stations according to the station bill.

Suddenly the lights went out in the ship's engine compartment. The umpire issued the following narrative to the action station commander: "Jagged holes on starboard

hull at waterline level." On the command of the action station commander sailors with plaster, struts and wedges rushed to the scene. They had no sooner set to work than another narrative to the effect that water was seeping through a burst welded seam was issued. The action station commander had to send some of the men to the stern bulkhead. It was extremely difficult to work in complete darkness. Remembering that there were some battery lamps in the life equipment locker, the commander ordered a sailor to fetch them.

The action station commander reported to the department head on the nature of the damage and progress of work to eliminate it only after he had been requested by the CP to do so.

The exercise went on. On the order of the engineering officer a group of sailors with a portable submersible bilge pump arrived from the neighbouring action station. The action station commander used this group to pump the seawage water out of the engine compartment bilge.

Then a critique preceded by a thorough preparation followed. The engineering officer analyzed the umpires' reports on the actions of the action station crews and carefully examined records of reports from the action stations to the command post and its instructions to the action stations. In his analysis the engineering officer dwelt on the estimate of the situation by the action station commander of the engine compartment, on his reports to the CP and on the organisation of cooperation. Then he recalled the sequence of actions in similar situations. He said that in the beginning it was necessary to examine all damaged spots, give relevant instructions to subordinates, take measures to eliminate the damage and report to the CP using whatever means available. Without information on the situation at the action station it is very difficult for the department head to take the correct decision and properly organise restoration of the ship's combat readiness. In the situation cited above, with the organic illumination inoperative, it was necessary immediately to provide lighting for the action station, making use of portable lamps and emergency battery hand and breast lamps. And what was particularly important, the action station commander had to maintain uninterrupted communica-

tion with the CP and make sure there was somebody on the line.

The department head also recalled the necessity to act quickly and competently in any situation, avoiding, however, making a fuss. When giving instructions to sailors, the action station commander should name the sailor being addressed. On arrival of the emergency group from the neighbouring action station it was necessary immediately to assign a mission to the group, clearly specifying what was to be done.

Competently conducted general emergency exercises and thorough critique thereof enable the personnel to improve their combat skills.

Such exercises held in conditions approximating real combat situations to a maximum degree help to work up teamwork and cooperation of department crews. At survivability exercises it is also urgent to work up narratives on restoration of organic and installation of standby communication or maintenance of communication through messengers.

To make the situation more complicated and bring it as close as possible to real combat, simulators are also widely used. This improves the quality of sailors' training and helps them to acquire practi-

cal skills and to practise action to be taken in an emergency.

Situations most commonly simulated during general exercises are inflow of water into the hull, equipment failures, enemy jamming interfering with normal functioning of radio, etc. The commander nevertheless sees to it that use of simulators does not result in actual damage of weapons and equipment, fire, flooding of separate compartments or accidents. Therefore, simulators are used in accordance with a special plan.

The simulation plan is drawn up in good time simultaneously with the plan of the exercise and approved by the ship's CO. It indicates the means and method of simulation, the time of beginning and ending use of a particular simulator, safety precautions, etc. The plan also specifies the persons responsible for safety, who are generally the officers, machinists and starshines most conversant with the design of the ship and of the equipment whose damage is simulated.

General emergency exercises are a mandatory component of the naval personnel's combat training. They enhance the ship's combat readiness and enable the personnel to acquire knowledge and skills in solving complicated problems arising in modern warfare.

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NAVAL FORCES

USE OF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS DESCRIBED

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 42-43

[Article, under the heading "Specialist's Tips", by Capt 1st Rank A. Lavrentyev:
"Using Navigational Aids"]

(Text)

The commonest marine navigational aids are gyro course indicators, relative speed indicators, as well as depth sounders. These are reliable means of safe navigation.

The gyro course indicator (gyrocompass) is used in the ship to measure the course and bearing to movable and/or stationary objects located either at sea or on land. The operation of the instrument is based on gyroscopic action.

Gyrocompasses such as the "Kurs" are provided with a pair of internally-linked gyros housed in a sealed sphere filled with an inert gas. The centre of gravity of the gyro follow-up assembly is lower than its geometrical centre, causing a pendulum effect during tilts. Inside the gyro follow-up assembly is an oil damping device. The gyro follow-up assembly is submerged in the flotation fluid and is in the centre of the aforesaid sphere, provided the operating temperature lies within 37 to 41°C.

The gyro follow-up assembly with the gyros suspended in the fluid is a sensitive element providing a stable meridian reference of the ship's position. The course is measured relative to the centre-line plane of the ship; with the bearing the reference datum will be an LOS (line of sight) on an object. The course reference is transmitted to the ship's receivers at various posts via the follow-up system and remote-controlled transmission line.

When the ship is cruising with constant courses and at steady speeds the gyrocompasses provide a stable course reference with an error not exceeding 1 deg. This error may rise to 2.5 deg. during manoeuvring. And it will be even more significant if the gyrocompass has not been duly adjusted. The gyrocompasses virtually do not depend on the ship's magnetic fields. They may operate for a prolonged period of time and require no scheduled maintenance. However, strict adherence to the gyrocompass manuals and operation recommendations is vital for safe navigation.

First and foremost, they should be thoroughly checked during preparation for a cruise. If required, the gyrocompass should be adjusted. During adjustment special attention should be paid to checking the insulation resistance and power supply.

A necessary step is to define and take into account the course and/or bearing correction of the gyrocompass. The course correction is intended to align the compass course of the ship. It is defined during a stay at the naval station using a technique that envisages taking a bearing of a coastal reference point by series during prolonged timeframe and after every 25-30 min, the direction of the reference point being known. The course correction is obtained by taking the average of the calculated single corrections of the gyrocompass. It should be used to correct the compass courses prior to plotting them on a map.

The gyrocompass may tend to change as time goes. Therefore, it should be periodically checked during a cruise. The bearing correction, as distinct from the course correction, varies depending on the circumstances of the cruise. It is defined when the bearing is taken. This is the only method which ensures the correction of a bearing with an adequate accuracy.

The systematic error of the course and bearing depends on the accuracy of installation of the master gyrocompass and gyro repeaters relatively to the ship's centre-line plane. Each repeater obviously has its own error (and consequently, correction). This leads to a certain inconvenience. Therefore, it is recommended to check the master gyrocompass and repeaters periodically for accuracy of installation with respect to the ship's centre-line plane. If the misalignment exceeds 0.1 to 0.2 deg. they must be re-installed to ensure an adequate accuracy of installation relative to the centre-line plane.

The dynamic-pressure logs have acquired a fairly good reputation among relative speed indicators. They determine the speed by measuring the dynamic pressure which is built up in the log tube during the ship's motion. The log incorporates a bellows which is a pressure-sensing element consisting of two chambers. The first chamber is fed with a total pressure (dynamic plus static pressure), the other one is supplied with a static pressure only owing to the draft. The bellows detects the dynamic pressure which is converted by the log computation circuitry into analog speed. The computed speed value is then transmitted to the ship's receivers via a remote transmission line.

The relative logs of the MGL-25 and LG-2 types are similar in design and reliable in operation, and do not require constant inspection and maintenance. The maximum measurement error of these logs lies within 0.5 to 1 per cent.

The reliable operation of the log depends on its technical condition, due and adequate periodic adjustments and checks. Always checked are the insulation resistance of the electrical and static "zeroes," the log compensator and remotely-controlled lines.

One should not forget that the log readings might have considerable errors if the log operates in the layer adjacent to the outer hull. To eliminate the errors the log is calibrated on the data obtained of a reference line with the ship cruising at various speeds. This allows to calculate the correction for each speed under test.

When repeated runs along the reference line indicate that the reference values of the errors of speed disclosed do not exceed the rated limit the log is adjusted. If not, the adjustment procedure must be repeated.

During operation the log reading error changes due to the various factors, e.g. the ship's outer hull becomes covered with microorganisms, the sea water density varies, the ship passes from one area to another, etc. All these should be taken into account to detect errors, analyse them and perform adjustment operations on the reference line. In addition, the hydraulic lines should be checked for air bubbles 5 to 6 times daily. The air bubbles accumulated should be evacuated.

To measure depth ships are provided with navigational depth sounders. The principle of operation of these instruments is based on observing the time between the emission

of the UHF oscillations propagated downwards and the return of their echoes from the sea bottom. The UHF oscillations are radiated by the sonar transducer. The oscillations reflected from the sea bottom are sensed by the receiver unit. Both units are attached to the ship hull. The depth below the keel is indicated as a turn angle of the disc in depth meters, turn angle of the shaft in recorders or by the number of pulses packing the digital counter during the propagation period of a pulse in the sea medium.

Navigational depth sounders are simple in design, convenient and reliable in operation. The measuring errors do not exceed 2 to 2.5 per cent of the specific depth. These instruments are small-sized and have low mass. The high accuracy and reliability of depth sounders is ensured by periodic adjustments and checks carried out in time and properly, and by defining and taking into account the instrumental corrections.

Special attention should be paid to checking the actual rotation speed of the depth sounder motor (indicator or recorder) so as to determine the deviation from the baseline value. This is vital since the deviation of the rotation speed of the motor shaft from the rated value might cause considerable errors in the echo sounding. The errors are eliminated by adjusting the motor's rated rpm or by calculating and taking into account the instrumental correction of the depth sounder.

During operation the supply voltage of the depth sounder should be monitored by the voltmeter. The voltage should not deviate from the rated specification by more than 5 per cent.

One should remember that the depth measurement range depends on the ship's hull shape and speed, the location of sonar transducers and receivers, pitch and roll, as well as the type of the seabed. Pitch and roll, and a seabed covered with silt or a sloping seabed will diminish the depth measuring accuracy.

After a cruise the log and depth sounder circuitry must be thoroughly checked, repaired if required, and prepared for the future operation.

Strict adherence to the manual requirements, and due account of the recommendations made by the fleet specialists, will ensure the prolonged, precise and reliable operation of the navigational technical aids.

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LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

CHIEF OF SIGNAL TROOPS INTERVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 80 pp 22-25

[Interview with Mar Signal Troops A.I. Belov, Chief of Communications of the Soviet Armed Forces: "Communication and Troop Control"]

(Text)

We know that troop control is one of the major components of military art. What is the role of the signal troops in providing firm, flexible and uninterrupted troop control?

Troop control embraces a wide range of questions, the most significant of which are: organisation of an all-arms battle or operation, ensuring close cooperation between formations, units and subunits of all arms of the service, and stable troop control in preparing for and during combat operations.

Signal troops are a special arm whose purpose is to establish communication and ensure troop control. Without reliable and uninterrupted communication it is impossible to effect leadership of subordinate formations, units and subunits, and direct their efforts at fulfilling combat missions and ultimately to achieve victory. It is no secret that the state of communication largely predetermines the effectiveness with which the different forces and weapons of armed struggle are used in battle and, eventually, the success of any combat or operation. History provides numerous examples of defeats suffered by the stronger side because the commanders lost control of the troops due to failure or interruption of communication.

All these principles were fully confirmed in the battles of World War II and the Great Patriotic War. What tasks did the signal troops carry out at that time, and what has the experience of using them shown?

In the years preceding the Great Patriotic War diverse measures were taken to work out the principles of organising communication, improve control facilities and the organisational structure of signal units and subunits, and train signal command personnel and reserves. Steps were also taken to develop communication systems in likely theatres of operations, and work was started to develop communication facilities which would meet the requirements of the time. Shortly before Hitler's forces perfidiously attacked the USSR, formations began to be equipped with a new generation of radio stations, general-purpose telephone sets, high-quality telegraph apparatus, field cables and other facilities.

The specific uses of signals' manpower and equipment during WWII and the Great Patriotic War were determined by the nature of combat operations. Great numbers of infantry, artillery and other forces clashed on the battlefields. Operations spread over a wide frontage and great depth, were tense and swift. The mobility of tank and mechanised forces, mass use of artillery, aviation and other new weapons and the great use of manoeuvre in combat operations rendered troop control more difficult and enhanced the role of the signal troops. Disruption of communication meant loss of troop control and placed forces on the brink of defeat.

The constantly growing significance of communication during the Great Patriotic War is attested by the increase in the numerical strength of the signal troops. By the beginning of the war they accounted for about five per cent of the total

number of troops, whereas towards the end they reached 10 per cent.

During the war the methods of organising communication and the structure and equipment of signal units and subunits at all levels were constantly improved. In the initial period of the war wire communication was the main means of troop control. However, it failed to guarantee efficient troop control in mobile forms of warfare.

In these conditions radio communication acquired great significance. Its organisation was continually improved, and the forces received increasing quantities of radio communication facilities. At the Battle of Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43 nearly 9,000 radio stations of different types were used, but in the Byelorussian operation in the summer of 1944 their number exceeded 27,000. From 1941 to 1945 Soviet industry produced over 325,000 radio stations for the front.

The constantly growing saturation of formations, units and subunits with radio facilities promoted active troop control and enhanced the effect of combat operations by artillery, tanks and aviation, for which radio was more often than not the only means of control.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of Soviet military regulations determining that stable communication can be achieved only through combined use of different facilities, the use of each particular facility depending on the situation, nature of combat operations, requirements of troop control and performance characteristics of communication facilities. Wherever this principle was strictly observed, troop control was not disrupted even in the most difficult situations.

During the war not only the quantity but also the quality of signal troops was greatly increased. The Soviet Command instituted the signal troops of the Supreme Command reserve, government communication troops, military signal repair units of the People's Commissariat (now Ministry) of Communication, special-purpose communication centres and mobile communication centres for command posts of fronts. New facilities were developed and old ones modernised. All this considerably improved troop control.

The Great Patriotic War revealed the importance and necessity of centralised leadership and uninterrupted control of the forces. On the other hand, the war experience showed that disruption of communication is a most efficient method of defeating the enemy. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that both the warring sides strove to disorganise the enemy's troop control by air and artillery strikes at headquarters, command posts and

communication centres and lines. It was therefore the signalmen's duty to defend the lines and immediately eliminate any damage.

On the whole, the steady improvement of the organisational structure and equipment of signal units and subunits and of the methods of using them, enhancement of command personnel's proficiency and soldiers', sergeants' and officers' special training standards contributed to successful fulfilment of missions for maintaining uninterrupted troop control during the battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Would you please tell about the signalmen's combat exploits and cite examples of their courageous and selfless discharge of their duties?

Military signalmen fought valiantly on all fronts. Numerous facts testify to their mass heroism.

In July 1941, a group of fighting men under A. Meri, a signal battalion political instructor, was detailed to provide communication for the corps headquarters. The Nazis attacked them, trying to disrupt communication. The fighting men accepted battle. Although A. Meri was wounded several times, he continued to direct the subunit. Communication of the corps headquarters was not interrupted for a single moment. The gallant political instructor was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In October 1941 Soviet signalmen spent eight hours under enemy bombing to lay over 40 km of cable line on the bottom of Lake Ladoga. Thus they ensured stable communication for GHQ with Leningrad Front Headquarters and blockaded Leningrad. Shortly afterwards another cable line was laid across Lake Ladoga.

The history of the Great Patriotic War abounds in instances of Soviet signalmen's readiness to discharge the commander's order at any price, even at the cost of their lives. An unforgettable feat was performed by Sergeant M. Novikov. The Nazis attacked him while he was repairing a damaged line. He did not have time to splice the wire. Seriously wounded, he held the ends of the wire together between his teeth and continued to fire back at the enemy. Novikov was killed, but communication continued to function. For this heroic deed he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Signalmen's heroic labour and combat exploits during the Great Patriotic War were highly appraised by the Motherland. Hundreds of thou-

sands of soldiers, sergeants and officers were decorated with government awards. Three hundred and three signalmen were honoured with the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 106 were awarded the Order of Glory, all three classes. Nearly 600 signal units were awarded Orders of the USSR, 200 of them twice; 58 independent signal units were transformed into Guards units, 172 front and army signal units were given honorary names of the cities and towns they helped to liberate.

Will you kindly tell about the development of the signal troops during the post-war period and the tasks they now fulfill?

The rich experience accumulated during the Great Patriotic War and the achievements of science and technology have proved to be a solid foundation for the build-up and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces.

At present the Soviet Army is provided with fundamentally new communication and control facilities possessing excellent performance characteristics.

Way back in the first post-war five-year plan periods the Soviet industry producing communication facilities mastered the production of field cable and high-frequency equipment which made it possible to lay multi-channel long-distance lines.

Mobile communication centres began to be produced on an industrial basis. Radio equipment has undergone qualitative changes. Its main jobs, with voice-frequency telegraph still in use, became type printing, use of high-quality radio telephone and transmission of telecoded information. A number of new items of equipment were developed and brought into service; they include radio-relay, troposphere and other systems which allow multi-channel lines to be laid faster than wire lines.

The advent of new weapons systems has radically changed the nature of operations and battles and enhanced the significance of troop control in achieving victory. The volume of missions carried out by the signal troops and the demands made on them have considerably increased. This applies particularly to the quality of communication and combat readiness of signal troops. Questions of secrecy and reliability of communication, survivability, capacity and noise immunity of communication systems have acquired a new meaning.

All these factors have led to new changes in the organisation of the signal troops and in the methods of developing new communication systems.

Use of automatic systems is the main trend in improving troop control. The use of such systems in the work of headquarters and forces has considerably enhanced the role of communication, whose channels ensure automatic traffic of large volumes of information. This gives rise to further development of automatic communication systems and enhances the reliability and quality of their channels.

Military signalmen, like all servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy, stand guard over the Soviet people's peaceful labour. They are always ready to ensure stable troop control in any situation and to discharge their patriotic and internationalist duty.

The high combat readiness of the Soviet signal troops is largely the result of the creative effort of Soviet scientists, workers and employees who provide the Soviet Armed Forces with modern communication and troop control facilities.

The constant care of the CPSU and the Soviet Government for the supply of equipment to the signal troops and its competent use by servicemen are a warrant of success in ensuring reliable troop control in the Soviet Armed Forces.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON U.S. INTENTIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 52-53

[Article, under the heading "International Affairs", by V. Yefremov: "The Mediterranean and the Pentagon Plans"]

[Text]

For some years now the Pentagon has been displaying particular military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the so-called "arc of instability" concept, worked out by the US National Security Council, this region is declared especially important for the defence of the "vital interests" of the USA. It is precisely with an eye to the strategic importance of this area that Washington is speeding up the talks on bringing Greece back into the NATO military organisation, exerting pressure on Turkey, suggesting new separatist plans for "settling" the Cyprus problem and seeking to draw Spain into NATO and to form a new bloc in the Middle East. Significant importance is also attached to the doctrine put forward by Washington of "direct involvement" of the USA in the Mediterranean, the implementation of which, the Pentagon brass hats hope, would compensate for the loss of military bases in Iran.

On orders from the White House the Pentagon strategists are now speedily forming a "quick strike" force of 110 thousand officers and men intended, first and foremost, for military operations in the rich oil region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. At the same time measures are being taken to strengthen NATO's southern flank.

A question suggests itself—what is really behind the US Mediterranean claims? Is there really some danger there threatening the United States? Events of late have confirmed beyond all doubt that the main reason why the US is showing such interest in the region lies in the Middle East oil

and the US striving to hold on to the strategic positions in the south Europe, on the islands of the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. That is the purpose of the US 6th Fleet and American war bases, of which there are more than enough already.

The 6th Fleet is made up of 50 different purpose ships, including aircraft carriers and submarines and also of some 200 carrier-based planes. Besides that, an amphibious group with detachments of marines is permanently stationed in the Mediterranean Sea in case of intervention operations against Middle East countries. American nuclear-powered submarines ply the waters of the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean near the shores of European countries. Naples and Madalena (Italy), Suda (Greece) and others serve as the principle bases for the US 6th Fleet.

In its efforts to maintain and strengthen its positions, Washington is obstinately doing all it can to submit countries in this area to its influence. In April 1976 the USA signed an agreement on military cooperation with Greece, which withdrew from NATO's military organisation in 1974. The United States now retains the right to go on using the Greek military bases. In exchange for this Athens was promised, "in accordance with the aims of the North Atlantic Alliance," military aid to the tune of 700 million dollars. As a result, as spokesmen for the main opposition Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) stated in parliament in December, 1978, some 40 military bases and Pentagon installations are functioning on Greek soil. They include electronic reconnaissance and gu-

dance stations, missile bases in Central Macedonia, bases for the U-2 spy planes, nine naval bases, military aerodromes and nuclear ammunition depots.

Today the Pentagon attaches much importance to restoring American-Turkish military relations to their former level. It did all it could for the repeal of the Congress decision imposing an embargo on American arms supplies to Turkey, because of which Ankara closed down the US bases on Turkish territory in 1975. The idea here is not only Turkey's proximity to the Soviet Union, which is always a major consideration for the United States and NATO, but Turkey's role of "northern watchdog of the Middle East and Africa." After the US Congress lifted the embargo in the summer of 1978 the Turkish government announced the reopening from October 9 of the same year, on the basis of a "temporary status," of some of the American bases on its territory.

The United States is showing a special interest in the military bases in Turkey, especially after the closing down of American intelligence centres and other military installations in Iran.

In January a high-ranking US military and diplomatic delegation visited Ankara. The Washington emissaries wanted to persuade the Turkish government to allow Pentagon to use military bases on Turkish territory for electronic espionage against the Soviet Union. In payment for this they offered Turkey a 450 million dollars military-economic aid programme. And the final result of all these efforts should be, the "New York Times" feels, the build-up of a military potential and introduction of new measures to ensure security, envisaging, perhaps, the formation of a pro-Western alliance of Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The scheme in itself is typical. It shows that Washington's strategic concept continues to revolve in a steady circle of appealing to force.

As is known, the Israeli authorities have for a long time already been offering themselves as servants to the Pentagon and NATO. As far back as in 1971 Moshe Dayan, then Israeli Defence Minister, offered NATO the use of aerodromes in the Sinai. In that same period the construction of installations connected with NATO's air defence system began on Israeli territory.

After the separate Israeli-Egyptian "peace" treaty was signed at Camp David under the patronage of the United States, Tel-Aviv's servility to Washington became still more pronounced. Immediately after the conclusion of this deal Israeli Prime-Minister Begin suggested that Washington should establish an American naval base in

Haifa and an air base in Ezion. He also asked Washington to place under Pentagon control the military aerodromes built by Israel on the Sinai Peninsula. At the talks the Washington emissary Straus had with spokesmen of the Israeli and Egyptian governments in the summer of last year he got their consent to build an American rocket base in the Sinai. There are increasingly frequent press reports that the Sadat regime is ready to place naval and air bases on the Sinai Peninsula at the disposal of the Pentagon. Naturally the Pentagon is using the most of Israeli and Egyptian benevolence. As the "Washington Post" wrote, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff have already completed plans for a new Middle East Command.

When planning direct aggression against Iran, the USA transferred large naval forces from the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Far East to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Simultaneously, as reported by Middleton, military observer for the "New York Times," the US Defence Department began looking for a site to build a new American base in the Middle East. Several "possible variants" are being hurriedly considered. The paper points out that the planned base, according to Pentagon schemes, is to be a trans-shipping point for the "quick strike" force and also to be used by the US Air and Naval forces stationed in the region.

Pursuing a policy hostile to peace, the Pentagon is cynically ignoring the interests and aspirations of the peoples of this region, including the national interests of the NATO countries. For example, although the Greek government is expanding its relations with the USA, it is doing so cautiously, in view of the fact that it sees American-Turkish cooperation as running counter to the national interests of Greece.

As regards other peoples in the Mediterranean area, whether Arabs or Africans, US disregard of their interests and the cynical imperialist policy conducted by the American military and oil monopolies evoke their wrathful protests. Concerning the American military presence in the Mediterranean the Lybian leader M. Gaddafi said: "Ships of the American 6th Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean are an active means of pressuring the peoples of Africa today just as they were half a century ago. The Fleet is a link in the chain of plots against the Arab peoples, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia and other independent regimes. It supports reactionary forces, including Israel and the racist minority governments."

To turn the Mediterranean Sea, which washes the shores of more than twenty countries of Europe, Africa and Asia, into a sea of peace is a long

standing dream of the peoples in this area. This question is periodically raised at representative international forums. The agenda of the Athens' Conference in 1978, in which almost 400 delegates representing various political trends took part, was "For Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean." The international conference against military pacts and bases, for world security and cooperation, which took place in July of last year in Nicosia, capital of the Republic of Cyprus, demanded measures to prevent an increase of tension in the Mediterranean area. Representatives of the Soviet Union took part in all these forums.

It is generally known that measures connected with military and political détente in the Mediterranean area are specified in a special paragraph of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet Union's proposal to withdraw vessels carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean Sea received worldwide public support. Pentagon is continuing to build up its military presence and to intensify its activity in the Mediterranean. Here too it is continuing to act in the spirit of the "position of strength" policy, the policy that brought Washington many disgraceful military and political failures. The Pentagon's "Mediterranean stake" cannot bring the United States the dividends it hopes for, because it goes against the vital interests of the peoples of the world, who are intensifying their struggle for peace, security and social progress.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

BOOK REVIEW: U.S. PRESIDENTS, POLITICS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 3, Mar 80 pp 60-61

[Article, under the heading "Book Review", by Col. B. Petrov: "Presidents and Politics"]

[text]

THE PRESIDENT is the head of executive power in the US. The country's foreign and domestic policies are closely tied in with him. What place has history relegated to American presidents? Owing to what forces and circumstances have they occupied the White House during the current century, and in whose interests have they functioned? The answers to these questions, as well as the political portraits of US presidents of the 20th century are presented in the monograph by Eduard Ivanyan.*

...The palm of the left hand rests on the Bible and the right hand is raised in the traditional position for taking solemn oaths. The future president repeats after the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the following words prescribed by the Constitution: "I solemnly swear that I will conscientiously execute the duties of President of the United States and to the best of my ability, protect, preserve and defend the Constitution of the United States..."

In the 200-year history of the United States, the author writes, every president has promised the people that he would justify the great trust they placed in him. Among the inhabitants of the White House there have been political figures chosen to this post in recognition of past merits or in the

hope that they would be the ones to achieve long-awaited changes for the better. There have also been men whose only "merit" had been blind submission to the political and financial monopolistic circles which nominated or supported them. Finally, there have been politicians who found themselves in the White House more or less by chance, usually after the death or murder of their predecessors.

As different as the men who occupied the post of President of the United States were, so too was their understanding of their responsibility to the country. Not only were the circumstances under which they assumed this post different, but also the historical conditions in which they governed.

The author begins his book with Theodore Roosevelt, who was elected vice-president in 1900. It happened that the then President William McKinley was killed by an anarchist in 1901, and Roosevelt found himself in the White House. Ivanyan describes him as follows: "A fearless rider, cowboy and aristocrat, threat to the trusts, a friend of the Morgans, a militant imperialist, chauvinist and advocate of 'general justice' — the many faces of this talented master of political mimicry in protecting his short career. He provided his many suppor-

ters and just as many enemies material for often diametrically opposing assessments of his place in American history."

Theodore Roosevelt "enriched" the theory of inter-American relations with his own interpretation of the well-known Monroe Doctrine when he declared that US interference in the internal affairs of Latin American countries shall be considered justified and legitimate if these countries prove to be incapable of handling their internal problems or in case of actions on their part which may cause intervention on the part of European countries in the affairs of the countries of the American continent. This sheds light on the precedent of many present-day developments in Latin America, where the United States is acting in full accordance with Theodore Roosevelt's behests.

Woodrow Wilson came to the White House in 1912. The chapter of the book devoted to Wilson is entitled "The Spurned Messiah." Here the author satirically describes a president who gave himself off as a messenger from God sent to re-establish justice on earth, but whose deeds showed him to be extremely cunning, self-assured and vainglorious. His actions were tightly bound up with the big monopolies. Lies and hypocrisy were part and

* E. A. Ivanyan, "The White House Presidents and Politics", Moscow, Political Literature Publishers, 1979, 161 pp. (in Russian).

part of Wilson's policy during World War I. He concealed his acting in the service of the monopolies under the cloak of a "messiah". As is known, he also went down in history as one of the organisers of the "Fourteen-State Alliance" against the young Soviet Republic, the land of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover were followed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who became president in 1932. The author writes about him in great detail:

It was under this president that the United States in 1933 officially recognised the Soviet Union. It should be pointed out that far from all of America's political forces were in favour of this recognition. Roosevelt was a hard lot. He took office at a time when the country was in the throes of a severe economic crisis, and in 1939 the Second World War broke out. But despite all these difficulties, the year 1940 marked the first time in US history that a president was elected for a third four-year term. The book convincingly shows that the decisive help for him was extended by Americans who stood for the strengthening of international solidarity against fascist aggression.

In 1944 Franklin Roosevelt was elected to a fourth term. In casting their votes for him, the voters expressed their support for a steady victory over fascism, which was coming closer and closer.

Shortly before his death on April 12, 1945, Roosevelt left the American people some far-sighted, don't'ral advice, which rings true to this day: "We cannot achieve world peace if we approach it from positions of suspicion and mistrust, or of fear."

The author writes that after learning of Roosevelt's death the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman paid a visit to J. V. Stalin and informed him of what had happened and told him that in accordance with the US Constitution Vice-President Harry Truman had been sworn in as president. For the first time in the nation's history the presidential office was taken by a man who was inexperienced politically and whose personal qualities were so different from those of his predecessor.

Later Truman himself admitted that he had been cast into the po-

litical arena (something which he had not even dreamt of) by millionaire Tom Pendergast, who needed his own people to win an election in the state of Missouri back in 1932. Truman admitted further: "I owe my entire political career to the Pendergast organisation. I am aware that this organisation supports certain evil doings." These admissions were not made out of the clear blue sky. Tom Pendergast was sentenced to a number of years of imprisonment for bribe-taking and tax evasion. Some protector?

The book goes on to analyse the beginnings of the "cold war," which Truman started in the spring of 1946. Referring to reliable American historians, the author discusses the first steps of Truman's "atomic diplomacy." It is this aggressive policy that forms the roots that to this day nourish the enemies of peace and detente, those who are fanning the flames of a new war.

Ivanyan stresses that in those years the authority of the Democratic Party, for which it is obliged primarily to Franklin Roosevelt's twelve-year stay in office, helped Truman win the 1948 election. The cold war was compounded by the period of intense reaction in the country which history has forever associated with the name of Senator J. McCarthy. The American historian K. Phillips wrote that McCarthyism assumed the full dimensions of cancerous tumour at the end of Truman's term, but the disease had begun and got out of control when he was in the White House. The book also discusses the long years of American aggression in Korea, which was begun at Truman's personal order.

The formation of the military-industrial complex was the natural continuation of this policy in the US. In his farewell speech to the nation President Dwight Eisenhower (he succeeded Truman in 1952 and held office eight years) warned of the danger of the military-industrial complex although he himself was instrumental in its flourishing. No one was in a position to stop this snowballing effect.

In the meantime the military-industrial complex was growing in strength. By the start of the 1962 fiscal year, the book notes, the US spent 10 billion dollars more on defence than in the last year of Eisenhower's stay in office. At that time the Administration was headed by

John Kennedy, a millionaire and son of a millionaire. Under him American intervention in South Vietnam was stepped up. It is the military-industrial complex which has always dictated its will to the presidents that unleashed this war to further its own interests.

In 1963 Lyndon Johnson replaced the assassinated John Kennedy. The new president declared that the war in Vietnam was an "American" war which the US had to "win at all costs." America was disgraced by this aggression. The author states that it was an infamous period of American history.

In November 1968 Richard Nixon became president. He was elected to a second term in 1972. In August 1974, for the first time in US history, a president resigned, admitting his guilt in violating the Constitution and in misleading the public. Nixon became the main figure in the much publicised "Watergate Affair," the greatest political scandal in American history.

The author aptly notes that the cold war not only coincided in time with Nixon's political career, it also conceived and nourished his ambitious aspirations. Nixon was supported by a California banker and reared by the ill-fated Senator McCarthy, whom Nixon helped get rid of those accused of anti-American activity but who were in actuality fighting for peace and against aggression and war.

Ivanyan's book concludes with an analysis of Gerald Ford's stay in office and the beginning of the Carter Administration.

The author has presented a whole gallery of political portraits of the US presidents during the age of imperialism and the general capitalist crisis. Each of these statesmen, while preserving purely individual character traits and leadership styles and adhering to specific political, philosophical and other views, possessed one quality typical of all American bourgeois leaders — that of being the representative of the political and economic interests of the ruling class and its monopolistic leadership.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to quote Karl Marx' words from the foreword to the first edition of "Capital": "...This is a question of individuals only inasmuch as they are the embodiment of economic categories, the bearers of specific class relations and interests."

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN

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[Article, under the heading "International Affairs", by Akbar Jabarov: "Friends and Enemies of Afghanistan"]

[Text]

The people of Afghanistan are now preparing to celebrate the second anniversary of the April Revolution of 1978 and proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have been rendering the Afghan people all-round assistance and support in their struggle for a better future, independence and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile the aggressive imperialist circles of the USA and other countries and the Peking extremists continue an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan.

A HISTORICAL TURN

ON APRIL 27, 1978, the Afghan army under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party, supported by the broad masses of the people, accomplished a revolution in Afghanistan. The Afghan people took their destiny into their own hands and embarked on the road of independence and freedom. Power in the state passed over to the Revolutionary Council which proclaimed the creation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and formed a people's government. Nur Mohammed Taraki, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, was elected Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.

The very first decrees adopted after the revolution showed that the people's power was intended to lead the country along the road of building a new society based on principles of social justice and liquidation of exploitation of man by man. All personal property and real estate belonging to the former King's family and its relatives was nationalised. The government began to

carry out a democratic agrarian reform. All peasants' debts to landowners and usurers were cancelled. As a result 11,500,000 people—80 per cent of the agricultural population were freed from the burden of debt. A decree on the equality of all ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan was published. For the first time in the country's history women were given the right to equal participation with men in building a new society. Measures were taken to introduce free medical service, education of children and juveniles, and hundreds of thousands of text-books were printed and distributed among the pupils free of charge.

In the field of international relations the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan proclaimed the policy of non-alignment, positive and active neutrality, support of national-liberation movements, good-neighbourliness and cooperation with all neighbours.

The April Revolution of 1978 brought about a radical turn in the history of Afghanistan and raised the traditionally good relations between the

Soviet Union and Afghanistan to a qualitatively new level. On December 5, 1978, a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation was signed in Moscow. This treaty laid down the main trends of further developing all-round relations between the USSR and the DRA, including their military relations. Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty says: "The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of traditions of friendship and good-neighbourliness, and also of the UN Charter, will consult each other and with the agreement of both sides, will undertake necessary measures with the purpose of ensuring the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries. In the interests of strengthening the defensive capacity the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field."

FAILURE OF BLOODY CONSPIRACY

Such a turn of events was not to the liking of those whose political, economic and ideological domination was shattered under the blows of the April Revolution. Deprived of their power and influence the propertied strata united their efforts and went from acts of unsubordination and sabotage of the new power to organising diversions and terrorist actions against the revolutionary forces. It goes without saying that the people of Afghanistan could have coped with the forces of counter-revolution by its own strength. But it was confronted by external aggression, by gross outside interference in its internal affairs.

Setting themselves the task of putting an end to the revolutionary changes which have taken place since April 1978, the imperialist circles decided to throw this country back to the dark Middle Ages. Thousands and tens of thousands of insurgents, armed and trained on the territory of Pakistan, and whole armed formations were sent into Afghanistan to fight the people's power.

It was the USA that inspired and organised the aggression against the people's Afghanistan. The immediate leadership in elaborating, planning and conducting operations against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was carried out by agents of the CIA such as Mr Louis Dupris, who in 1979 headed the group of "specialists" of this administration for subversive anti-Afghan operations. It was this group which began to knock together a "united military alliance" of anti-Afghan forces. In this the USA pursued quite definite self-interested

aims; the Pentagon had already estimated where and what military installations aimed at the USSR can be located on Afghan territory to replace the ones lost in Iran.

Hafisullah Amin, an agent of the CIA, and a traitor to the revolution who strove by all possible means to take power in post-revolutionary Afghanistan, considerably helped the aggressor's actions against Afghanistan. In September last year, Nur Mohammed Taraki was removed by him from the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and General Secretary of the Party and was killed soon after together with several members of his family. Having seized power, Amin undertook harsh repressive measures against broad sections of Afghan society, Party and military cadres, representatives of the intelligentsia and the Muslim clergy—that is to say, the sections on which the April Revolution had relied.

The CIA stated that the regime of its agent Hafisullah Amin "corresponded entirely to the lasting interests of the USA" and began to make intensive use of this traitor for its purposes. Early in October 1979 Amin held a secret meeting in Kabul at which he and his lackeys discussed and approved the conditions of an "alliance" with the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan," and concrete plans for carrying out a coup d'état. It was decided to renounce immediately after the coup all the slogans of the April Revolution, to liquidate the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to prepare and carry out in a short time severe physical reprisals over the Party leadership and its activists. In the "new state of Afghanistan" the CIA agent Amin was to be president and counter-revolutionary Gulbuddin Ekmalier was to occupy the post of prime minister.

In the middle of December 1979, a personal representative of Amin went by special plane to Paris, Rome and Karachi to meet agents of the American special services there and inform them on the progress of preparations for the coup d'état which was planned for December 29, 1979.

But events took quite a different turn in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. While the interference from without and the terror spread by Amin inside the country created a real threat to the democratic system, the patriotic forces inside Afghanistan rose both against the external aggression and the usurper and traitor. Relying on support from the people, they removed Amin.

The unceasing armed intervention and the far-reaching implications of the conspiracy of the internal and external reactionary forces created a real threat of Afghanistan losing its independence and being turned into an imperialist military bridgehead. In the situation which had taken shape, the new leadership of Afghanistan headed by Babrak Karmal urgently appealed to the Soviet Government to render immediate help in the struggle against external aggression.

The Soviet Union decided to comply with this request and sent to Afghanistan limited military contingents to be used exclusively to help repulse aggression from without. They will be fully withdrawn from Afghanistan once the reasons for the Afghan leadership's request for them no longer exist.

The request of the Afghan leadership and the Soviet Union's positive reaction to it proceed from the 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation, from the interests of securing peace in this area. Both sides acted in full conformity with international law, in particular with Article 51 of the UN Charter which provides for the inalienable right of states to collective and individual self-defence for the purpose of repulsing aggression and restoring peace.

THE UNDECLARED WAR CONTINUES

Imperialist and Peking propaganda deliberately and shamelessly distort the Soviet Union's role in Afghan affairs. They spare no pains to represent the Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan as "intervention" or "aggression." All this is an obvious lie intended to facilitate the fulfilment of the own imperialists' and the Peking hegemonists' plans in Southwest Asia. The fact is that under cover of the hullabaloo about "Soviet intervention" the USA, Britain and other NATO countries and China increase their assistance to those elements who invade Afghanistan from the Pakistani territory.

Representatives of the above mentioned countries do all they can to encourage the Pakistani leadership to intensify hostile actions against Afghanistan. In January-early February this year alone, first Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, then British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrew Peacock and finally Zgibniew Brzezinski, the US President's special assistant for national security, together with Deputy Secretary of State W. Chris-

topher and Under-Secretary of Defence D. McGiffert visited Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, for urgent talks. They went first of all to Peshawar and other parts of Pakistan, where there has long been a dense network of camps for the so-called "Afghan refugees" but actually for training and arming counter-revolutionary mercenaries who are then sent to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Western press announced that in Peking the US Secretary of Defence H. Brown had talks with the Chinese leaders concerning the anti-Afghan actions.

"In effect, imperialism together with its accomplices launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan," said L. I. Brezhnev in an interview to a "Pravda" correspondent. In Pakistan, according to information that has leaked into the world press, there are between twenty and thirty special camps and fifty bases where units of different strength are formed for subsequent dispatch to Afghanistan. It is there too that secret agents and bands of terrorists and saboteurs are trained. Their instructors are experienced agents of the American and Chinese secret services and officers of the Pakistani army.

The scale of the external aggression against Afghanistan can be judged, for example, by the information of the British "Daily Telegraph." Already at the end of the October last year, military operations were carried out in 12 out of the 28 provinces of Afghanistan. More and more numerous bands of insurgents are being sent into Afghanistan. It has been established that the total number of bandits sent across Afghanistan's border has reached 45-50 thousand.

Capitalising on the Pakistani regime's economic and political difficulties, Washington and Peking are out to make Pakistan the main base of their aggressive hegemonic plans in the Middle East, in the immediate vicinity of the southern frontier of the Soviet Union, the main springboard in their struggle against Afghanistan. Hence the flow of high-ranking visitors to Pakistan and promises of immediate military and economic aid. Washington has announced the appropriation of 8400 million for this purpose in the next two years. Moreover, Brzezinski said in Islamabad, according to the "Washington Post," this was only the beginning. It is not fortuitous therefore that Washington ruling circles today begin to speak so loudly of uniting the bands sent to Pakistan, of turning them into a sort of army.

It is clear from the above that interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan has been ac-

tually taking place and that the USA and its Peking assistants have sponsored it. And they tried to use the UN for the purpose. Washington and Peking were the initiators of the discussion on the so-called "Afghan question" in the UN despite the objections of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As is known this venture did not work. Representatives of many countries considered this discussion as an attempt to involve this international organisation into activities directed at interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and at the same time with the help of lies and slander to camouflage military preparations of imperialism in the Middle East.

The American leaders maintain that the present day dangerous actions of the USA in this part of the world are only a "response to the Afghan events." According to a Pentagon secret report "Military Variants in the Persian Gulf," an account of which was given by the "New York Times," the present actions were elaborated on the instructions of H. Brown, US Secretary of Defence, "nearly two years ago."

The Iranian-American conflict and delivery of weaponry to Pakistan fill the peoples of Asia and the Middle East with apprehension. India, one of the biggest Asian countries, unequivocally stated this. The peoples of the countries in this area are waging a persistent and prolonged struggle against imperialism fully aware who are their friends and who are their enemies. They know full well that it is the United States of America who is intruding in foreign lands and waters, concentrating naval forces many thousand miles from their own country, building new military bases in the Arab East, Africa and the Indian Ocean.

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